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This research came about as the result of dialogues with The New Zealand Mountain 
Safety Council and discussions with Dr Nicolas Cullen. Within this document the behaviour 
and decision making of backcountry terrain users is observed and discussed. The behaviour 
of humans is notoriously random. This is particularly evident within this research. Users are 
seen to take uncharacteristic risks in order to be the first person to ski fresh snow. For people 
reading this document without knowledge, or experience of alpine recreation, it is important 
to acknowledge the deep emotional and spiritual connection that people have with what is 
effectively frozen water.  
Over the years there have been many mountaineering and backcountry skiing books 
published. These are often personal accounts of life-threatening events or major 
achievements. Below are two quotes; one from Robert Macfarlane’s book, ‘Mountains of 
the Mind’, and one from Charlie English’s book, ‘The Snow Tourist’. These have been 
provided in an attempt to convey the emotional connection that backcountry users have with 
such activities. 
…“Mountains seem to answer an increasing imaginative need with in us all. More 
and more people are discovering a desire for them, and a powerful solace in them. At its 
root, mountains, like all wildernesses, challenge our complacent conviction that the world 
has been made for humans by humans. Most of us exist for most of the time in worlds which 
are humanly arranged, themed and controlled. One forgets that there are environments 
which do not respond to the flick of a switch or the twist of a dial, and which have their own 
rhythms and orders of existence. Mountains correct this amnesia. By speaking of greater 
forces than we can possibly invoke, and by confronting us with greater spans of time than 
we can possibly envisage, mountains refute our excessive trust in the man-made. They pose 
profound questions about our durability and the importance of our schemes. They induce, I 
suppose, a modesty in us.”… 





…“In the nineteenth century, Fritjof Nansen wrote that skiing washes civilization clean from 
our minds by dint of its exhilarating physicality. By extension, I believe that snow helps strip 
away the things that don't matter. It leaves us thinking of little else but the greatness of 
nature, the place of our souls within it, and the dazzling whiteness that lies ahead.”…  
       Charlie English, 2003, Chapter 11 
Those with experience skiing backcountry terrain will understand the immense 
satisfaction that accompanies hiking to the top of a mountain or in to a secluded bowl and 
skiing what feels to be the best run of your life. Throughout the world there are backcountry 
trails aptly named for the emotional effect that they have. The name ‘Stairway to Heaven’ 
in Verbier, Switzerland, and numerous backcountry trails called ‘Now I Can Die’, go some 
way towards indicating the sensation one feels when travelling in backcountry terrain. The 
nature of skier behaviour is complicated; with physical, social and emotional factors each 
having an effect on the decision making of individuals. This research provides an insight 












Avalanche fatalities in New Zealand increased as alpine terrain became more 
accessible and popular amongst recreationalists. This increase began in the 1950’s and 
continued through to the 1990’s. During this time an average of two people were being killed 
in avalanche events each year. With advances in avalanche safety technology, snow research 
and education, fatalities in New Zealand have decreased to the present average rate of less 
than one person per year. 
While there is knowledge pertaining to the demographics of avalanche victims, there 
is very little information regarding numbers and demographics of people using backcountry 
terrain. The aim of this research is to assess the behaviour and decision making of 
recreational users of avalanche terrain accessed from the Craigieburn Valley Ski Area 
(CVSA), Canterbury, New Zealand. The following objectives are used to complete this aim. 
Firstly, observational information is obtained regarding the frequency and preparedness of 
users in backcountry terrain. Secondly, information will be gathered on how users make 
informed decisions about their behaviour in areas that contain a hazard. To achieve these 
objectives a mixed method approach is applied.  
Field work for this research was conducted over 20 consecutive days from 6 August 
2015 to 26 August 2015 at CVSA. A transceiver checkpoint was designed and deployed on-
mountain to gather data on the frequency of users and the level of equipment use in 
backcountry terrain. A questionnaire was developed to gather demographic, education, 
experience, equipment and decision making information from backcountry users. In 
addition, data on snow stability, temperature and precipitation was gathered during the study 
period. This was used to give an understanding of the effect that weather and snow 
conditions have on user numbers and behaviour. 
Key findings of this research include identifying factors affecting the level of 
avalanche transceiver use amongst backcountry users. The behaviour of backcountry users 
and the social effects on their decision making is shown to be a complicated mixture of 
familiarity, scarcity, social proofs and risk acceptance. Transceiver use varied from 42% to 
69% and appeared to depend on snow and weather conditions, as well as timing within the 
week. On average half (52%) of users in backcountry terrain at CVSA were carrying an 
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avalanche transceiver. This is very low given the spatial and temporal variability of 
snowpack stability and associated avalanche risk in CVSA’s backcountry terrain.  
The absence of backcountry user knowledge regarding avalanche danger and 
primary avalanche type brings to question the effectiveness of avalanche advisories. This 
study shows that backcountry users at CVSA may not be viewing additional information on 
the advisories and instead, are simply taking notice of the region’s danger level. 
Additionally, the effectiveness of ski area signage is questioned. The lack of users ability to 
determine primary avalanche danger type indicates that this information is not being used 
by backcountry users. Possible changes to signage and advisory systems is therefore 
suggested. Likewise, modification of education programmes to include more emphasis on 
carrying gear, identifying decision making traps and pre trip planning is required.  
This research has implications for current understanding of decision making in 
backcountry terrain. Initially it was believed that due to the high level of males in avalanche 
fatality statistics (90% in Irwin and Owens, 2004), that women must be making better 
decisions when travelling in backcountry terrain. However, the results from this research 
indicate that the high number of male fatalities may be the result of a higher number of males 
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Glossary of terms 
Avalanche size: 1. up to 10 cubic metres. Not enough to bury or kill a person. 
    2. up to 100 cubic metres. Enough to bury or kill a person. 
3. up to 1,000 cubic metres. Could bury a car, remove trees or 
seriously damage a building. 
4. up to 10,000 cubic metres of snow. Enough to bury two 
rugby fields in 1 metre of snow. 
Ava-lung: Device designed to extend fresh air supply in the event of 
avalanche burial and thus extending survival time. 
Avalanche air bag: Inflatable bag designed to float the user to the surface of an 
avalanche or to create an enlarged air pocket in the case of 
complete burial. 
Chutes:   Steep narrow ribbons of snow held within rocky outcrops. 
CVSA:   Craigieburn Valley Ski Area. 
MSC:    New Zealand Mountain Safety Council. 
On-Field:   Terrain within the ski area boundary. 
Primary avalanche type: Most likely type of avalanche to occur on any given day. 
Risk compensation: User putting themselves in higher risk situations because of 
the feeling of safety that the gear that they are carrying 
provides. 
Skiing:    Used to indicate skiing, snowboarding and touring at CVSA.  
Snow pack: Refers to the depth of snow from surface to the ground. 
Snow profile: Graph of snowpack layers including layer hardness, 
temperature and ice crystallography. 
Transceiver: Personal radio beacon specialised for locating people buried 
under snow.   
Untracked:   Snow that has not yet been skied on. 
Weak layer: Layer within snowpack that has a lower cohesive strength 
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1.1 Context  
Internationally the numbers of people using backcountry terrain for recreation has 
increased in recent decades. This increase has been consistent with the growth of avalanche 
related fatalities (Page et al., 1999). With such an increase in avalanche related fatalities it 
is no surprise that there has been an increase in the number of avalanche education providers. 
The American Institute for Avalanche Research and Education reported that in 2008 there 
were over 300 providers in the United States. Whereas twenty years prior there were 100 
(Furman, et al., 2010). This has led to an increase in the number of people completing 
avalanche training. 
Traditionally, avalanche education focused on the “at risk groups”. They can be 
defined as those who contribute to avalanche fatality statistics the most. In New Zealand the 
most at risk groups based on fatality statistics are males and those in their twenties (Irwin 
and Owens, 2004). These educational programmes usually consist of information about 
snowpack, terrain analysis, weather effects and observation techniques, including what to 
look out for known as “red flags”. With developments in snow science and avalanche 
formation in the 1980’s and 1990’s, the focus turned to the effect of human factors. 
McCammon (2004) suggested that recreational backcountry users fall into ‘heuristic traps’, 
where the brain unconsciously makes decisions using “rules of thumb” to speed up the 
decision making process. McCammon (2004) reviewed 715 avalanche incident reports 
between 1972 and 2003 in the United States. From these records he was able to determine 
six heuristic traps common throughout fatalities.  
New Zealand’s alpine terrain contains steep slopes with seasonal snow covering over 
35% of the South Island and 5% of the North Island (Irwin and Owens, 2004). The mountain 
climate reflects the maritime location and the mid-latitude westerly flow over New Zealand. 
This causes warmer winters than at similar latitudes in the Northern Hemisphere. The 
climate is also associated with rapid changes in temperature, which is related to the onset of 
cold fronts approaching from the Southern Ocean and warm fronts from the Tasman Sea. A 
large proportion of the mountainous regions in New Zealand are within national parks and 
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reserves, which makes them easily accessible, promoting a high level of recreation and 
exploration of these areas. As a result Irwin and Owens (2004) indicate that there has been 
an increase in avalanche fatalities from 0.2 per annum (pa) in the 1930’s to 2.0 pa in the 
1990’s. It is believed that this is both the result of an increase in user numbers of alpine 
terrain and the population increase of alpine towns. Between 1981 and 2003 there were 48 
avalanche related fatalities in New Zealand. Sixty percent of these were from people 
involved in alpine climbing and 15% were from people completing training courses. 
Combined skiing related fatalities make up 16% of total fatalities over this period. These 
include ski area work (4%), ski touring (4%), heli-skiing (2%), skiing in area (2%), skiing 
out of bounds (2%) and snow sports operations (2%) (Irwin and Owens, 2004). Over the last 
two decades there has been a noticeable reduction of avalanche fatalities, which may be the 
result of an increase in avalanche education and control measures (Figure 1.1).  
 
Figure 1.1: Avalanche fatalities per decade in New Zealand 1860-present. Data sourced from 
Irwin and MacQueen, (1999), Irwin and Owens, (2004), Logan, (2014) and Supplemented 
















Irwin and Owens, 2004 Logan 2014 Irwin and MacQueen, 1999 Average
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1.2 Aim and objectives 
The aim of this research is to assess the behaviour and decision making of recreational users 
of avalanche terrain accessed from the Craigieburn Valley Ski Area in the central South 
Island, New Zealand. This will be achieved using the following objectives; 
1. Obtain observational information about the frequency and preparedness of users in 
backcountry terrain. 
2. Investigate how avalanche terrain users make informed decisions about their 
behaviour in areas that contain a hazard.  
To achieve these objectives a mixed methods approach is applied. A variety of 
methods was needed as a wide range of information was required to assess user behaviour 
in addition to assessing numbers and preparedness of skiers in backcountry terrain. 
To achieve objective one, a transceiver checkpoint was developed and deployed at 
CVSA. This incorporated an infrared sensor to determine user number and a transceiver 
checker to determine the proportions of avalanche transceiver use in backcountry terrain. 
Objective two was achieved with the use of a backcountry user questionnaire. This contained 














1.3 Thesis structure 
This thesis is separated into the following chapters. Chapter 2 builds on the 
introductory chapter presented here (Chapter 1), by providing a synthesis of relevant 
literature. The formation, type, initiation and variation of avalanches is discussed. A 
synthesis of the available training options for avalanche education is then provided. Human 
risk perception and decision making is also discussed. The penultimate section reviews how 
equipment can affect the decision making process of backcountry terrain users. Literature 
on the Craigieburn Range and other research involving backcountry users is discussed in the 
final section. Chapter 3 introduces the research location and an overview of Craigieburn 
Valley Ski Area (CVSA). The methods used for observational and backcountry user data 
collection are described and justified. Chapter 4 introduces the results of this research. This 
begins with weather and snow stability over the 2015 winter season at CVSA. This is 
followed by a description of the weather and snow stability over the study period of this 
research. Ski area and backcountry user numbers, including data from the transceiver 
checkpoint is shown in this section. Effects on backcountry user numbers are indicated, as 
is the relationship between backcountry user numbers and views of the online avalanche 
advisory. Backcountry user information including demographics, experience, education and 
preparedness is also shown. This includes backcountry user behaviour and decision making. 
Chapter 5 contains a discussion of the key findings and limitations of this research. Chapter 














 The following chapter synthesises literature relevant to the two research objectives 
of this study. To determine how users make informed decisions about their behaviour it is 
important to understand the various indicators that they use to determine the level of the 
hazard. This is done by exploring avalanche formation processes. This includes identifying 
the two main types of avalanches, typical avalanche terrain and discussing snowpack 
structure. Snowpack stability, avalanche initiation and fracture mechanics is then explained. 
In addition to this, the spatial and temporal variability of snowpack stability is analysed. The 
variety of options for avalanche education as well as the many forms of avalanche 
information available to the public is then presented. Risk perception, behaviour and 
decision making is discussed in terms of avalanche awareness. The final section provides an 
over view of current literature on the Craigieburn Range and provides information on similar 












2.2 Avalanche formation 
The first scientific statements on the behaviour of snow and avalanches can be traced 
back to the beginning of the 18th century. Johann Scheuchzer, a Swiss scholar and 
mathematician recorded observations of moving snow on one of his research trips. His book 
“Description of the National History of Switzerland” was then published and included many 
insightful observations for protection from avalanches (Pudasini and Hutter, 2007, pg 27). 
“… practically never erect buildings at the foot of a steep mountain unless there is 
a hill or a wood appropriately located on the slope which could divert the rolling avalanche 
to the sides or force it temporarily to lose its power upon arrival in the valley.” 
       Johann Scheuchzer, 1706 
The first serious attempt to understand the behaviour and physical properties of snow 
and snow cover in motion was completed by Johann Coaz (head of Swiss Forest 
Inspectorate). From 1879 through to the 19th century he established public awareness of the 
dangers of snow avalanches in Switzerland and abroad (Pudasini and Hutter, 2007).  From 
this research, early work on avalanche defence for infrastructure was completed and by the 
1920’s promoters for ski tourism, rail, road and hydropower development were demanding 
scientific methods to be adopted for avalanche research (SLF, 2015). This lead to an 
explosion in avalanche research both in Switzerland and internationally. Avalanche research 
centres began to be established in other non-European countries including Japan, USA and 
Russia (Pudasini and Hutter, 2007).  
Snow avalanches can be placed into a larger group of hazards including rock falls, 
landslides, rock avalanches, debris torrents and ice avalanches (McClung and Schaerer, 
2006). These are known as mountain-slope hazards. Such hazards cause major problems for 
recreational users of mountainous regions and to the people that work or reside in these 
areas. A snow avalanche is an erosional process. This process is very minor in terms of 
erosion of the base or bed material but is a major component of snow erosion and 
transportation on a mountain slope (Butler and Walsh, 1990).  Snow avalanches occur when 
the stress forces are greater than the strength forces of the snowpack (Schaerer, 1981). This 
generally occurs on slopes where the angle is between 15o - 60o. Below 15o the angles are 
generally not sufficient for stresses to become high enough for failure of the snowpack and 
above 60 o the angle is so great that snow is unable to accumulate (Alexander, 1993). This 
has been revised by Jamieson (1999), Schweizer and Lutschg (2001), and Goddard (2008), 
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who state that avalanches occur primarily on slopes where the angle is between 30o - 45o. 
Avalanches can occur on slopes outside this angle, but these are considerably less frequent 
compared to avalanches within the 30o - 45o range (McClung and Schaerer, 2006). In a Swiss 
study in 2013, 76% of human triggered avalanches occurred on slopes angled between 34-
45 degrees (Tremper, 2008). 
Snowpack refers to a depth of snow that has accumulated over several snow events. 
The physical properties of a snowpack are controlled by the processes operating on the ice 
crystals during their formation. These properties vary from event to event and are influenced 
by humidity, wind, crystal size and shape. Crystal characteristics may also be altered when 
snowflakes are broken and smoothed into more spherical particles as they bounce along the 
snow surface (Grey and Male, 1981). As the snowpack is the result of a series of snowfall 
events, layers of varying strength develop. This strength comes from the interaction between 
snow grains within the snowpack. The variation in strength arises from the varying 
conditions during which the snow is deposited. In between snowfall events the snowpack 
surface can be modified by various processes including rain, wind erosion and deposition, 
surface melting and refreezing. These processes can cause a thin layer of modified snow on 
the surface with different properties to the snow below (Campbell, et al., 2006). As these 
layers are further buried by snow, they become a structural weakness in the snowpack and 
this weakness can cause a failure in the snowpack, leading to an avalanche occurring. These 
weak layers can also form within the existing snowpack. Known as depth hoar, these layers 
form when the snowpack contains a large temperature gradient (Giddings and LaChapelle, 
1962). Crystals within low density layers become nucleation sites for rising water vapour 
from the higher temperature base of the snowpack. This results in the growth of coarsely 
grained crystals which have poor bonding to surrounding structures. Due to the poor bonding 
this layer has low strength and is prone to failure under sheer stress (Alley, et al, 1990). 
Depth hoar is shown to form within the New Zealand snowpack, but requires low 
temperatures, clear nights and a shallow snowpack (McNulty and Fitzharris, 1980). 
Snow avalanches are defined as a moving mass of snow descending rapidly down 
sloped terrain (Schweizer, et al., 2003). There are two main types of avalanches; these are 
called “loose snow” and “slab” avalanches. Loose snow avalanches generally take place in 
snow where there is little structure or cohesion between the snow particles (Smith, 2004). 
These occur on the surface of the snowpack and generally form at a single point. This may 
be triggered by a failure of a small section of snow, snowfall off a rock face or human 
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interaction with the snow surface (McClung and Schaerer, 2006). The propagation of the 
avalanche follows a triangular shape, with the narrowest point at the point of failure and 
expanding outwards as the snow moves down the slope (Figure 2.1a). Usually there are very 
few fatalities from loose snow avalanches because these avalanches propagate below the 
initiation point and are on the surface of the snowpack. The biggest danger is the distance 
of the avalanche propagation threatening anyone or anything on the slope below. A further 
danger is that these loose snow events can propagate onto unstable areas of snow thus adding 
to the stress on the slope. This has the potential to initiate the second type of avalanche. 
The most destructive type of avalanche is a slab avalanche (Figure 2.1b). These occur 
where there is a strong cohesive layer that breaks away from a weaker underlying layer. This 
usually occurs when there is a weak layer in the snowpack such as a refrozen surface, low 
density ice crystal formation, a water saturated layer or a warmer layer of snow (Smith, 
2004). This layer creates a surface where movement is possible. The avalanches that form 
as a result of a weak layer are usually more dangerous as they result in a large block or 
blocks of snow propagating down the slope. The upper fracture often occurs where there is 
either a topographic feature that causes more stress on the snowpack or the overriding layers 
are poorly bonded to the base (Schweizer, 1999). These avalanches are often triggered by 
natural or human effects including the increase in weight on the slope either by rain, loose 
snow avalanche or from human use (Smith, 2004). Slab avalanches travel down the slope in 
a linear fashion and often leave a distinctive crown where the fracture point occurred. This 
is shown as a vertical face in the snow.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Two main types of snow avalanches, loose (a) and slab (b) avalanches (from 
McClung and Schaerer, 2006). 
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2.3 Avalanche terrain and indicators  
The level of danger that an avalanche poses is dependent on the terrain that it is in. 
Avalanches are more or less likely to occur when there are certain features present or not 
present (Guy and Birkeland, 2013). Being able to recognise these features allows the user to 
make informed decisions on their passage through this terrain.  
The aspect of a slope plays an important role in the formation of the snow pack 
(Birkeland, 2001). Slopes with a southerly aspect contain the greatest variation in stability 
in the Southern Alps, as lower temperatures cause weak layers to persist much longer than 
on north facing slopes (Macara, 2012). Slopes facing north in the southern hemisphere, 
receive more solar radiation than those with a southerly aspect. This can cause major 
differences in stability between slopes of different aspects.  
Altitude also plays a major role as more snow and wind occur at higher elevations. 
Generally the higher the elevation the higher the number of avalanches (Birkeland, 2001). 
Although this is not always the case, typical New Zealand snow storms will bring rain to 
lower elevations, if the freezing level rises above the snow line then rain will be deposited 
onto the snow surface. This adds weight to the snowpack and has the potential to decrease 
the stability of the layers within the snowpack. 
Rainfall or snowmelt weakens the snow pack in two different processes. Firstly there 
is an increase in weight on the slope. Secondly the addition of water can raise the temperature 
of the snow pack, weakening the bonding between snow layers (McClung and Schaerer, 
2006). During periods of warmer weather (spring) snow layers can collapse initiating wet 
snow avalanches; these are generally triggered naturally. However, during spring skiing the 
most favourable time to ski these steep wet slopes is before mid-day as the snow remains 
cooler. The addition of water to the snowpack can also strengthen the snowpack. This occurs 
when percolating water causes the snowpack to become isothermal. This can remove weak 
layers present within the snowpack and upon re-freezing, causes additional bonding and 
strengthening of these layers (Marcus and Moore, 1983). 
Old snow can be observed from a snow pit. The difference in the layers of snow can 
indicate the stability of the snow. As a general rule, deep snowpack with similar layers is 
favourable. A weak snow layer 1 metre or more below the surface is also favourable as the 
weight of an individual skier is unlikely to penetrate through the snow pack to this depth 
(McClung and Schaerer, 2006). Unfavourable conditions include a shallow snowpack, large 
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variations between snow layers and weak layers close to the surface (>1 metre from surface). 
Assessing the snowpack becomes more important when obvious visual avalanche indicators 
are not present.  
When the wind blows, snow is stripped from the windward face and is deposited on 
the lee wind slopes (Figure 2.2). This is called cross loading and often occurs on the ridges 
between gullies. Wind loading can create perfect conditions for slab avalanches to occur. 
Strong constant wind and easily erodible snow when combined can deposit large volumes 
of snow on the lee slopes (Li and Pomeroy, 1997). Uniform surfaces of snow in these areas 
should be treated carefully, especially when there is a weak layer present in the snow pack.  
 
 
Figure 2.2: Aeolian snow transport, stripping and depositing snow on either side of the ridge. 
Wind direction was from left to right. Figure adapted from the New Zealand Avalanche 
Centre. 
It is also important to determine if there are any terrain traps if an avalanche were to 
occur. Terrain traps are places that will increase the severity of the avalanche due to the 
terrain that it will run through. These include cliffs, rocks, flat spots, roads, crevasses, trees 
and gullies. Visual indicators should be the initial indication of stability. If there are no visual 
indicators for an avalanche hazard then the snow pack should be viewed to cover the lack of 






2.4 Snow pack stability 
The analysis of factors contributing to snowpack stability is well documented. 
Publications by McClung and Schaerer (1993), Tremper (2008) and Goddard (2013) provide 
detailed analysis of the wide range of factors affecting snowpack stability and avalanche 
formation. Within these books the overriding theme is that snowpack formation and 
subsequent stability relies on a combination of temperature, wind and precipitation. Snow 
can be created in many differing forms, from the classic six point crystal to hail and ice 
pellets (Figure 2.3). Primarily, temperature controls the size and shape of these snow crystals 
(McClung and Schaerer, 1993). However, the level of moisture available and wind speeds 
also play an important role in the formation of these crystals.  
Once these crystals form they are then deposited onto the surface and will form a 
layer. This layer will have a strength based on its crystal type and temperature. Over time 
these layers build up and form a snowpack of varying snow layers, densities and strengths. 
By digging a snow pit it is possible to view these layers. These layers are not constant across 
a slope. This is due to the influence of localised changes in solar radiation, temperature and 
wind. Once deposited these crystals are also affected by transportation mechanisms. As a 
snow crystal is transported by the wind it bumps into other particles fracturing in the process. 















2.5 Spatial and temporal variability of snow stability 
McClung and Schaerer (2006) and Tremper (2008) provide detailed analysis of the 
factors contributing to snowpack stability. They suggest a mixture of snow pits, weather 
analyses and recent avalanche activity help to determine the stability of a slope. The use of 
a snow pit allows detailed information on the different layers within the snowpack to be 
gathered. Variables that are often measured include, snowpack structure, layer hardness, 
crystal type, crystal size and snowpack temperature. Through this analysis it is possible to 
determine potential weak layers, which are important for skier initiated slope failures 
(Macara, 2012). McCammon and Schweizer’s (2002) report analysed 145 human triggered 
avalanches in the Swiss Alps and Canada, 96% of these slopes had a weak layer less than 1 
metre below the surface and 78% of these layers were less than 10cm in thickness. This 
shows how frequent weak layers occur within the snowpack. 
The spatial variation of snowpack stability is a focus of Schweizer et al. (2008) 
where variations in surface snow characteristics across 4 sites in Davos, Switzerland were 
analysed. It was found that the largest variations inn snowpack stability was observed 
whenever the snowpack had been wind effects. Indicating that exposed locations are likely 
to have differing conditions to sheltered locations. This variation can be responsible for error 
and uncertainty in avalanche forecasting. The decision to apply snowpack variables from 
one snow pit to another nearby area that is exposed to differing conditions is problematic. 
Macara (2012) successfully demonstrated that stability testing from a single snow pit cannot 
consistently represent the snowpack conditions of an entire slope at CVSA. This result is 
also indicated by Landry et al. (2002, 2004), where large spatial variations in slope stability 
were discovered. The largest discrepancy shown in Macara’s research (2012), was the 
difference between forecasted slope stability and observed stability. Areas of high instability 
with highly unstable weak layers at depth were observed on slopes where the forecast 
indicated low avalanche hazard. It was also shown that stability on-field was not 
representative of stability in the backcountry. This was primarily due to the differences in 







2.6 Avalanche initiation 
Avalanches can be trigged by both natural and anthropogenic factors. Natural 
triggers are often associated with the addition of snow or water to the surface of the slope. 
This causes an increase in stress on the slope, which may lead to a failure in the snowpack, 
resulting in slope failure. Natural trigger points are difficult to pinpoint. Anthropogenic 
triggers include skier initiated snowpack failures. This is the result of the addition of weight 
to the surface increasing the stress on the snowpack. These failure points are generally 
smaller and easily defined points where failure has occurred.  
Natural triggers are related to changes to the snowpack, these include; new snow or 
precipitation, wind loading, temperature changes, melting and refreezing of snowpack layers 
(McClung and Schaerer, 2006). The addition of more weight to the slope will increase the 
stress on that slope. If a weak layer is present within the snowpack then the addition of this 
weight may cause the initiation of an avalanche. Schweizer et al. (2003), notes that a new 
snow depth of 30 cm or more is considered enough to initiate an avalanche. Anthropogenic 
triggers play a major role in avalanches. Intentional initiation in an effort to make the slopes 
safer for users is common practice for ski patrol. This includes snowpack testing and the 
application of explosives to initiate an avalanche. Avalanches are often initiated by a 
recreational skier, tour group or other user of the slope (McClung and Schaerer, 2006).  
McClung (1979) developed a Shear Model based on gravitational potential and slope 
angle to test snow stability. This was the most commonly used model for fracture 
propagation as it worked well in steep terrain. However, under this model it was not possible 
to have weak layer collapse of flat terrain. This is known as “womphing” and is characterised 
by a womph sound as the weak layer collapses and the air escapes. This was one of the main 
short comings of this model as it is possible for this to occur on flat terrain. This lead to the 
Anti-crack Model being created by Heierli et al. (2008). This model builds on work by 
Bradley (1968).  
The Anti-crack model argues that the collapsing snow within a weak layer causes 
the primary force in fracture propagation. This allows remote triggering of avalanches from 
terrain previously thought to be too flat to initiate avalanches. This can be observed on 
terrain where there are “U” shaped valleys. As the user moves through the flat section in the 
bottom of the valley they can cause the weak layer to collapse. If this is of sufficient size 
then the collapse may propagate through the weak layer and given persistent weak layers 
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may collapse layers on the steeper slopes. Birkeland et al. (2014) built on previous research 
by Birkeland et al. (2010) and Gauthier and Jamieson (2008), with research on the effects 
slope angle has on the force required to initiate a weak layer collapse. This research found 
that there was no statistical relationship between slope angle and the force required to cause 
a collapse, for slopes between 0-40 degrees.  
Birkeland et al. (2014) conclude that the primary consideration for their research is 
that tests on slopes with low slope angle are a useful tool rather than putting yourself in the 
questionable area. This may allow users to determine slope stability prior to getting on the 
slope. However, Macara (2012) indicates that due to the spatial variability in slope stability 
multiple pits need to be dug in order to determine slope stability. These need to be completed 
at a similar elevation and slope aspect in order to achieve accurate and reliable results. 
 
2.7 Avalanche education available in New Zealand 
In New Zealand the Mountain Safety Council (MSC) was created in 1965 in response 
to concerns over the increasing number of incidents in outdoor recreation (MSC, 2015). This 
council was formed by a number of governmental and recreational organisations. Within the 
MSC, an avalanche advisory board known as the New Zealand Avalanche Centre was 
created. This provides a backcountry avalanche advisory as a public service. The Avalanche 
Centre seeks to encourage people to participate safely in land based outdoor activity. In 
addition to this they wish to foster support for outdoor safety in the community and promote 
the development and maintenance of national outdoor safety standards for land based 
outdoor activities (Avalanche Centre, 2015). The Avalanche Centre is the primary source of 
avalanche information in New Zealand. It includes online avalanche information and links 
to avalanche education providers in New Zealand. The Avalanche Centre also provide a 
website where regional avalanche advisories are created by local avalanche controllers and 
uploade. These advisories include the most recent avalanche danger, primary avalanche type 
and information on the likelihood and size of avalanche activity. Information on recent 
avalanche activity and current snowpack conditions is also included in these advisories.  
In early 2015, the MSC began shifting away from outdoor safety and training to 
safety messaging as indicated by Figure 2.4. These changes are in an effort to reach more 
people and direct limited funding towards wider public engagement and understanding of 
safety messages. This has had major ramifications for avalanche education in New Zealand. 
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Until 2015, the New Zealand Mountain Safety Council (MSC) oversaw avalanche education 
programmes, with help from private organisations and tertiary education providers. Due to 
the changes to the MSC, these programmes are now provided solely by private organisations 
and tertiary education providers. The MSC is no longer formally a part of avalanche 
education in New Zealand. The MSC has retained the intellectual property rights to course 
content and indicate that they are working closely with providers to ensure courses continue 
into the future.  
 
 
Figure 2.4: Changes in the focus of the New Zealand Mountain Safety Council. 
 
Avalanche courses provide backcountry and alpine users with information regarding 
the danger of avalanches, likely avalanche terrain and recovery techniques. These range 
from basic introductory public lectures to advanced avalanche forecasting and rescue 
courses for professionals. The effectiveness of these courses has been under scrutiny, which 
may have contributed to the transfer of these courses from the MSC to private organisations. 
The basic avalanche awareness course covers information on understanding mountain 
weather, snowpack, decision making, avalanche terrain, route selection, rescue techniques 
and safety equipment. Higher level programmes such as Avalanche Stage 1 and 2 courses 
are run by tertiary education organisations such as the Otago Polytechnic. These more 
advanced levels of training include a diploma in avalanche studies that covers the formation 
of avalanches, interpreting snow crystal form and structures within snowpack, search and 
rescue, and safe terrain and route selection. These advanced courses are designed for people 
who wish to be employed in avalanche monitoring and safety management.  
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There are several books and publications regarding avalanche awareness and 
improving safety in avalanche terrain. These include “Avalanche Awareness”, “The 
Avalanche Handbook” (Figure 2.5a, 2.5b) and “Alpine Skills and Research Techniques”. 
There are also freely available publications such as “The Crystal Ball” (Figure 2.5c), which 
is an avalanche magazine published by the MSC. This magazine is a biannual publication 
and includes recent avalanche activity, recent advances in avalanche safety techniques and 
research methods, and incorporates an over view of avalanche accidents in New Zealand 
(MSC, 2014). There are also several ski/snowboarder magazines that often contain 
avalanche information, avalanche gear reviews and “tales of survival” (Nzskier, 2014; Ski 
‘n’ Snow, 2014). The use of books and magazines are seen as informal education. 




Figure 2.5: a) Avalanche Awareness in the New Zealand Backcountry, 2nd edition, Penny 
Goddard 2013. b) The Avalanche Handbook, McClung and Schaerer 1993. c) Crystal Ball 




2.8 Perception of risk and backcountry decision making 
The perception of risk in terms of an avalanche is very complex, owing to the wide 
range of people who may be using terrain where avalanches occur. This can range from 
people with no experience to professional avalanche controllers. There are, however, three 
main types of human error that users of avalanche prone terrain fall into. These are a lack of 
education or experience, desire for challenging terrain and the effects of heuristic traps 
(McCammon, 2004). Having a lack of education or experience is often seen in avalanche 
fatality reports. This is apparent in backcountry recreationalists, who do not have the 
practical or theoretical knowledge to determine the level of risk that they are exposing 
themselves to (McClung, 2002). Risk assessment requires being able to test the snowpack, 
being able to identify avalanche terrain and being able to apply proper rescue techniques in 
the event of an avalanche (McCammon, 2004).  
The desire for challenging terrain is the second type of human error evident in the 
backcountry. Desirable weather conditions can cause recreationalists to move into terrain 
that they are not familiar with which may be high risk areas (Haegeli et al., 2010).  These 
people are generally more focused on having an unforgettable day rather than being vigilant 
to hazards. McCammon (2004) notes that individual recreationalists are known to make 
uncharacteristic decisions, putting themselves in a higher level of risk in order to be the first 
to access excellent conditions.  
The third type of error is falling into heuristic traps. This is defined by McCammon 
(2004) as unconscious decision making following rules of thumb. This type of decision 
making allows snap decisions to be made and is favourable when dealing with routine risks 
such as crossing a road or driving a car. Avalanches provide complex risk situations, where 
these sub-conscious decision making processes can give an inaccurate perception of the 
hazard (McCammon, 2004). This is known as falling into a heuristic trap. These traps 
include slope familiarity, consistency, scarcity, the expert halo, social facilitation and 
acceptance. These heuristic traps may cause people to either overestimate their ability or 
underestimate the avalanche risk of backcountry terrain. 
 Slope familiarity occurs when the user has been utilising the same or similar slope 
for an extended period of time. This can result in the user failing to analyse the slope for 
indications of instability. The user is more likely to ski a slope without checking for changes 
in stability. In McCammon (2004 p3) “condition consistency”, represents the circumstances 
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where a user has used a slope several times either that day or in the last week without issue. 
This causes a lull in the perception of risk and may cause the user to stop looking for signs 
of instability.  
Scarcity can also have an effect on user risk perception. When an opportunity 
presents itself to ski an untouched area after a fresh snowfall, or there is the chance to ski an 
area before it is skied out, decision-making short cuts are often taken (Fredston et al., 1994). 
Often avalanche risk analysis is completely dispensed with and the user will vie to be the 
first person on that slope. This causes the user to ignore the physical evidence of instability 
and inevitably leads to an increase in risk.  
The expert halo is another trap, where a person in a group is seen as more able to 
make decisions than others. This may be based on experience or education. The less 
experienced people in the group are more likely to agree with the “expert’s” decision and 
are less likely to carry out their own assessment of slope stability and safety. They believe 
that the “expert” would have thought of everything (McCammon, 2004). This phenomenon 
can be backed up by social facilitation, where users see others using the slope and assume 
that it is safe. These individuals are also likely to be pressured into using particular areas 
outside their skill level or comfort zone when with a group of people. This fosters the notion 
that there is safety in numbers. Unfortunately this is not the case for avalanche safety. 
Acceptance of risk can be a trap, where the user determines that there is a level of 
risk but they believe that they are able to overcome this risk with their experience or 
education (Fredston et al., 1984). There can be an overestimation of skill level in addition 
to an underestimation of the risk. This is associated with two extreme groups. The group 
who are high risk takers will filter the information and focus on the reasons to continue. 
Subsequently they put themselves in a more risky situation as they draw optimistic 
conclusions from the physical evidence. Alternately there are those who are inherently 
conservative. They mitigate risk by actively looking for information to back up their 
informed decision. These people will search for evidence of slope instability before looking 
for signs of stability (Fredston et al., 1984; McCammon, 2004). 
 In a joint report by the Alaska Mountain Safety Center and the Utah Avalanche 
Forecast Center titled ‘The Human Factor – Lessons for Avalanche Education’, it is 
concluded that the majority of avalanches involving people are caused by human interaction 
with the slope (Fredston et al., 1984). Most accidents occur when people underestimate the 
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hazard or overestimate their ability to deal with it. These authors note that victims tend to 
make decisions based on human desires and assumptions rather than hard evidence and the 
integration of key pieces of physical information (Fredston et al., 1984). 
Fredston et al. (1984) conducted a review of 350 intensive avalanche hazard 
evaluation and rescue workshops, along with reviews of hundreds of avalanche accidents. 
Their results indicate that human desires, assumptions and the overlooking of physical 
evidence play a major role in decision making in avalanche terrain. Noted human factors 
affecting the decision making process include, incorrect assumptions, attitude, weather, 
transfer of skills, communication and city versus mountain thinking. Many of these factors 
are also described in McCammon (2004) as heuristic traps.  
The role of expertise is critical for both controlled and automated decision making 
(Kahneman and Klein, 2009). This is due to the difference between novices and experts 
abilities to organize complex information, notice cues to instability and disregard irrelevant 
information. Novices may not know what to look for or may not know that the hazard may 
exist. It is likely that backcountry users must make a decision based on cognitive physical 
indicators, (e.g. snowpack), emotional (e.g. desire to have fun) and social (e.g. desire to 
impress others) factors (Furman et al., 2010). As a result, a novice backcountry user may 
become overwhelmed with the number of decisions to make and either consciously or 
unconsciously falls into heuristic traps as defined by McCammon (2004). 
Decision making in avalanche terrain has traditionally been viewed as rational 
choice, where all relevant information is reviewed and alternatives discussed (McClung, 
2002a, 2002b). However, decision making in avalanche terrain is much more complex than 
was previously thought. Collection of all the relevant information and discussing the 
alternatives is a lengthy process and is unpractical for those already on mountain. It is for 
this reason that heuristics are employed. As mentioned earlier, these are short cuts to 
decision making where often small pieces of information are given greater weight. 
In avalanche terrain, decision making can be broken into individual and group 
decision making. Haegeli et al. (2010) looked into the decision making of individuals in 
respect to avalanche hazard. While non-voluntary exposure to avalanche hazards are 
controlled via ski field management, users of backcountry terrain are voluntarily exposing 
themselves to avalanche hazards.  Individual decision making is more of a binary decision, 
will I go or not. These decisions are usually based on the individual’s tendency to take risks 
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and the likelihood of a reward. Often these decisions have little or no regard for others and 
may put the individual in a higher level of risk than those in a group dynamic. Whereas 
group decisions generally take into account the needs of the group as a whole. In theory, 
limiting the risk exposure to the least prepared group member should be undertaken. 
Unfortunately, this is not always the case, with the least experienced group member often 
being put out of their comfort zone. 
In the past, studies of decision making in avalanche terrain focused on avalanche 
incident and fatality records (Atkins 2000; McCammon, 2004). Others attempted to use 
avalanche awareness surveys (Atkins and McCammon, 2004; Pfeiffer and Foley, 2006). It 
is noted in Haegeli et al. (2010) that while these approaches can provide insights into issues 
with decision making, they are not able to capture the relationship between minimizing risk 
and maximising recreational enjoyment.  Backcountry decision making should be examined 
by direct monitoring of recreational backcountry users. Such monitoring should be 
compulsory, with all users completing a decision making survey. 
 
2.9 Literature on Craigieburn Range and method justification 
The earliest study of avalanche activity on the Craigieburn Range is a report by 
McNulty and Fitzharris (1980). This report outlines the weather, snow conditions and 
avalanche activity over a 4 month period in 1977 at Porter Heights Ski Field. The purpose 
of this report was to determine the factors leading to a large slab avalanche event in spring 
1977. A depth hoar formed in early winter that was subsequently covered by snowfall events. 
This was determined to cause an unstable layer at depth leading to an avalanche in spring. 
This was due to increasing temperatures and accelerated snowmelt, causing an increase in 
stress on the snowpack. From this report it was recommended that ski fields with areas of 
potential avalanche terrain should have weather and snow conditions monitored daily and 
snow pits dug weekly throughout the winter.  
Prowse et al. (1981) studied how people adjust to avalanche hazards. An increase in 
avalanche hazard was believed to be driven by a 300-400% increase in ski field patronage 
and an increase in recreational activity in alpine terrain (Prowse et al., 1981). Fitzharris et 
al. (1983) piloted an avalanche forecasting system. This system was the first to incorporate 
people, meteorological data and field observations. At the same time Prowse (1981) was 
working on snowfall, snow metamorphism and melt in the head-waters of the Craigieburn 
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Range. The resulting record was, at the time, the most extensive and reliable snow and 
climate interaction record. It incorporated 6 years of climate data and 3 years of field 
measurements of snowpack structure.  
McGregor (1990) studied the seasonal development of the snowpack on the 
Craigieburn Range at 1700 m.a.s.l. This research indicated that there are 3 stages of 
development in relation to avalanche formation. These stages include: a weakness in snow 
stratigraphy, weakness in old snow surfaces and weaknesses in temperature gradients within 
the snowpack layers. It was revealed that the development of snowpack structure is 
controlled by the interaction of temperature gradients and melt freeze processes within the 
snowpack during the first half of the winter season (McGregor, 1990). The importance of 
temperature gradients is still acknowledged in modern avalanche forecasting techniques. 
McGregor (1989) also researched the snow avalanche terrain of the Craigieburn Range. This 
research indicated a strong relationship between avalanche terrain, avalanche formation and 
avalanche initiation. Critical terrain was identified as areas where there are open bowl-
shaped slopes with a slope angle >30o in the lee of ridges (McGregor, 1989).   
Spatial and temporal variation in snowpack stability was analysed at CVSA by 
Macara (2012). The results from this work showed that local stability can be considerably 
different from the forecasted stability. Stability ratings of the snowpack in the backcountry 
was found to be significantly different from on-field stability ratings. Considerable spatial 
variability of snowpack stability was observed and indicates that observations from a single 
snow pit could not represent the snowpack of an entire slop, let alone an entire ski field, 
including backcountry terrain. This variability indicated that the avalanche risk in the 
backcountry was likely to be different to that within the ski area.  
A considerable difference between the aspect of avalanche terrain on-field and 
backcountry at CVSA was found by Macara (2012). Ninety four percent of primary 
avalanche terrain (slope angle between 30o and 40o) in the backcountry was found to be of 
a southerly aspect. Compared to 25% for on-field terrain (Macara, 2012). Layer weaknesses 
within terrain with a southerly aspect is likely to persist for longer periods of time due to the 
lower levels of solar radiation causing lower temperatures. This reinforces the idea that 
conditions within the backcountry are likely to be different to that of on-field observations 
and the forecasted avalanche risk. 
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Past research on the Craigieburn range is mostly snow science focused, which 
provides a unique opportunity to study how people interact with avalanche terrain. There is 
a gap in the current avalanche literature, with many researchers looking at decision making 
and equipment use separately. This research has been designed to combine behaviour, 
decision making, frequency and preparedness of backcountry users. It is believed that by 
combining these observations, trends in backcountry users will become apparent and effects 
on the decision making process identified. 
 
2.10 Summary 
Contextual information has been provided to give an understanding of the wide range 
of factors affecting avalanche risk. Technical avalanche information was included in this 
chapter to highlight the complexity involved in the proper assessment of avalanche risk in 
backcountry terrain. Human factors were included as these play a major role in decision 
making. The methods provided in the following chapter arise from the need to gather 
information on user frequency and preparedness in backcountry terrain. As well as user 
















Research Methodology  
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will outline the research site, data collection and data analysis used to 
investigate the numbers of people using backcountry terrain, and the behaviour and decision 
making of these users. Section 3.2 describes the Craigieburn Range with a focus on the 
Craigieburn Valley Ski Area. Section 3.3 describes the data collection process. A detailed 
description of the transceiver checkpoint, which was developed for this research is given in 
Section 3.3.1. Following this is information on the specific location of the transceiver 
checkpoint used in this study. Section 3.3.2 contains the method used for backcountry user 
statistic data collection. This includes describing the backcountry survey that was created in 














3.2 Research location and site description 
The Craigieburn Range is located in the Southern Alps of New Zealand’s South 
Island (Figure 3.1). The mountains within this range reach a peak height of 2194 metres (Mt 
Enys), with a dozen peaks above 1800 metres. The range is known for high levels of snowfall 
each winter and as a result is home to five ski fields. Craigieburn Valley Ski Area, Broken 
River, Mount Cheeseman, Mount Olympus and Porter Heights Ski Fields are found on this 
range. McGregor (1989) indicated that there were 137 active avalanche paths along the 
range. These avalanches were found to initiate between 1660 and 2134 metres above sea 
level. The aspects of these avalanches ranged from north-easterly to westerly, with limited 
numbers of avalanches on north-easterly or north facing slopes (Macara, 2012).  
The Craigieburn Valley Ski Area (CVSA) is a club field 104 km west of Christchurch 
(Figure, 3.1). It features 400 hectares of skiable terrain, including three high speed access 
rope tows (Figure 3.2). The designated ski area extends from 1308 m a.s.l. at the base 
building to 1811 m a.s.l. at the top of the top tow. Hamilton Peak rises to the south to an 
elevation of 1922 m a.s.l. The ski area is known internationally and locally for its steep 
terrain, with 45% of its terrain being considered “advanced”. The ski lodge at the bottom of 
the field is often used as a base for backcountry skiing and touring expeditions. The CVSA 
website claims that its field has “the easiest to reach advanced off-piste skiing anywhere in 
the world”. The website also has some advice for those heading out of the ski area boundary. 
“Travel in groups, know your snow-craft, wear avalanche transceivers, and consult the ski 
field manager or field staff before departing”. As evident from the website, and from 
discussions with the MSC, CVSA is very interested in avalanche awareness and off-piste 
safety. This is reflected by the extensive research that has occurred along this range over the 




Figure 3.1: Topography of the CVSA. Map insert indicating location within the South Island 
of New Zealand. The ‘X’ indicates the location of the transceiver checkpoint used for the 







In Figure 3.2, backcountry terrain to the north of the ski area is indicated by blue 
colouring. The area directly to the right of the ‘X’ is called ‘Castle’; this south east facing 
slope contains prized skiing terrain. Steep rocky chutes surround a large open bowl which 
provides a mix of intermediate and advanced terrain. This terrain is very popular with users 
seeking backcountry terrain close to the ski area. Beyond this bowl moving towards ‘North 
Peak’ (1828m) is ‘Lazy-mans’. ‘North Peak’ and ‘Lazy-mans’ are the most frequently used 
backcountry routes in CVSA’s backcountry. ‘Lazy-mans’ is accessed at the bottom of the 
ascent to ‘North Peak’. This south east facing terrain consists of several rock features but is 
mostly open terrain of moderate steepness. ‘North Peak’ is accessed by following the ridge 
north east, with this area containing steep south facing chutes, wide scree slopes and open 
bowl terrain. This area is a favourite of users seeking a longer backcountry trip, with walking 
time to ‘North Peak’ around 30-45 minutes depending on fitness and snow conditions. 
 
Figure 3.2: Facing north west, proportions of terrain within the ski area’s boundary indicated 
in red and easily accessible backcountry terrain indicated in blue. ‘X’ marks the location of 




3.3 Data collection methodologies  
In order to gather a mixture of observational and user statistical data, a mixed 
methods approach was used. These methods included a transceiver checking station, user 
frequency counter, on-field data bases, an automatic weather station and obtaining user 
behaviour information using a questionnaire. Field work for this research was completed 
over 20 consecutive days from 6 August 2015 to 26 August 2015 at CVSA.  
 
3.3.1 Observed data 
For this research, a transceiver checkpoint, similar to Waller et al. (2012) was 
developed and deployed (Figure 3.3). The transceiver checkpoint used in this study 
combined user frequency (IR sensor) with preparedness (Transceiver Checker) to determine 
the frequency of users in the backcountry in addition to the number of these users carrying 
working avalanche transceivers. This check point was set up in a similar way to those already 
in use in Jackson Hole Mountain Resort in Wyoming, USA. This method for measuring 
backcountry users was introduced in 2011 by a public outreach campaign in cooperation 
with several ski fields and avalanche centres (Waller et al., 2012).  
There were two parts to the checkpoint. A TRAFX infrared sensor was used to 
determine the number of users passing the ski area boundary (Figure 3.4). This was set up 
to timestamp movement events and had a reset time of 0.5 seconds. This allowed groups of 
users to all be recorded, even if they were travelling close together. To determine if the users 
were carrying an avalanche transceiver or not, a BCA Beacon Checker was deployed (Figure 
3.3). This was run off a 12 volt 17amphr battery (Figure 3.4). The battery had enough charge 
for 10 days of operation; at this point the data from the data logger was downloaded and the 





Figure 3.3: Transceiver checkpoint on ridge, looking south towards ski area. 
Using Loggernet™ software a logging system was set up on the CR1000 data logger, 
set to record battery voltage and voltage through a closed circuit switch at 1 second intervals. 
The CR1000 data logger was set to record the amount of voltage running through the voltage 
switch because of the ‘gate’ function on the BCA transceiver checker. This allowed a pulse 
of electricity to be transmitted when a transceiver was detected. Rather than this opening a 
gate it was used to set off a voltage switch which the data logger could then record. This 
corresponded with the red cross of LED lights changing to a green circle on the BCA beacon 
checker’s display. The transceiver checker was also set to emit a beeping tone to indicate a 
transceiver was present. The reload time for this device was 2 seconds, which meant that 
Housing for data loggers 
and power supply 
Infrared sensor 
BCA Beacon Checker 
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users who were walking close together were sometimes counted as one on the transceiver 
checker but with the addition of the IR these events were able to be identified and data 
adjusted.  
 
Figure 3.4: Transceiver checkpoint logger box and power supply.  
The transceiver checkpoint was positioned on the saddle of Middle Basin (1720m) 
en route to CVSA’s well known off-piste areas, Castle and North Peak. The checkpoint was 
positioned on the edge of the ski boundary (Figure, 3.5). Users passed through this 
checkpoint as they left the ski area boundary and accessed unmanaged backcountry terrain. 
This site was suitable for the checkpoint as there was an uphill incline from the traverse line 
along the ridge to its location (Figure, 3.6). This meant that users had to remove their skis 
and walk up towards the checkpoint. This caused people to spread out, allowing the 
transceiver checkpoint to reset between users. 
 
Infrared data logger 12 volt 
battery 
Voltage switch 




Figure 3.5: Close-up of the CVSA trail map indicating the point where users move from on-
field to off-field terrain. Location of transceiver checkpoint is indicated by a red cross. Image 
from www.craigieburn.co.nz accessed September 2014. 
After the first snowfall event, it was evident that users were bypassing the checkpoint 
and a fence line was established to herd users towards the checkpoint (Figure 3.6). After 
each subsequent snowfall event, a path was cut through the snow along the fence to further 
encourage users towards the checkpoint. As indicated in Figure 3.6, not all users were 
willing to follow the cut path and fence. Several users continued to go through or over the 
fence. This was estimated to be a small proportion of users from the number of tracks on the 
other side of the fence. These users were mostly skiing the southern side of Castle, as noted 





Figure 3.6: Transceiver checkpoint on the ridge between Middle Basin and Castle. Fence 
line was added to ensure users travelled past the checkpoint. (Note: Fence unable to be seen 
in original image, graphic added to indicate location) 
To determine the proportion of on and off-field users, the field user database was 
used in conjunction with the transceiver checkpoint on Middle Basin saddle. Total on-field 
user numbers were obtained from the ticket office located at the base of CVSA. In addition 
to these data, the ticket office collected information on high avalanche risk days. This 
information included transceiver use and road transport used to access the ski area. During 
the study period this occurred once on 8 August 2015.  
Snowpack conditions were analysed by the two on-field ski patrollers (Seth Orton 
and Brandon Levy), who created snow profiles and uploaded them to INFOX. These were 
downloaded with permission granted to the author and reproduced in Section 4.4. Snowpack 
observations provide essential information on the structure of the snowpack and allows 
stability testing to occur. Interpretation of snow profiles is provided in Appendix A.   
Climatological conditions were measured using a Department of Geography, 
University of Otago, automatic weather station on the ski area. This was located on Kea 
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Ridge (1649m), directly east of the lunch hut. Data collected by this station included air 
temperature, relative humidity, air pressure, wind speed and direction. Observational climate 
data were also collected by ski patrol at a weather plot outside Ngahere staff office (1265m). 
These observations provided rain and snowfall measurements during storm cycles over the 
study period. 
3.3.2 Backcountry user statistics 
To achieve the second objective, questionnaires were used to gather as much 
information as possible from backcountry users. Questionnaires have the advantage of being 
cheap and reasonably fast to complete. The questionnaire contained a mixture of factual, 
behavioural, attitude and latent trait questions as defined by Mellenbergh (2008). Prior to 
completing the questionnaire, the users were asked a screening question, “Did you travel 
outside the ski area today?” If the response was “yes”, the survey was given to the user to 
complete. The questionnaire contained a progression of screen questions to classify users 
into various demographic groups. These initial questions were used to help capture interest 
in the survey and were followed by key questions regarding avalanche experience, 
education, gear and decision making. The final questions were designed to gather 
information on group dynamics and decision making. It is noted that to achieve the best 
response rate, questions should progress from the least sensitive to the most sensitive as the 
user falls into response mode and is more willing to answer personal or difficult questions 
later on in the survey (Burn and Brush, 2010). Surveys were completed in the lunch hut 
during the day and in the dining room after the ski area had closed for the day. The author 
was always on hand to help clarify the questions if required. A total of 58 surveys were 
completed over the study period, taking 5-10 minutes to complete. 
Analysis of survey responses was completed using a Chi2 test. This test was used to 
determine if there was a statistically significant difference between responses to certain 
questions. Due to the responses being ordinal and having small sample sizes this statistical 






3.4 Justification of methods 
The methods chosen for this research were determined by the literature review in 
Chapter 2. Waller et al (2012) began working on prototypes of transceiver checkpoints and 
safety information for popular backcountry trail heads in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, USA. 
This work and subsequent publications (Waller, 2012; Waller and Schell, 2014) provided 
additional information on checkpoint design and set up requirements. 
The location for this research was chosen due to the nature of the Craigieburn Range. 
This range contains many club ski fields and endless backcountry terrain. Being a part of 
the Southern Alps this range is very exposed to both westerly and southerly storm events. 
As a result this range receives large volumes of snowfall and is very popular with 
backcountry users. Craigieburn Valley Ski Area was chosen for several reasons. This field 
has easy access to backcountry terrain and the ski area is known to attract more experienced 
users as it has very little beginner terrain. 
The site for the transceiver checkpoint was chosen so that it would capture users 
travelling outside the ski area boundary. This meant that the checkpoint had to be positioned 
on the edge of the ski area where it wold be able to capture user traffic. There was already 
an established post marking the ski area boundary at the top of the ridge so this was used. 
The post was slightly off the traverse line into the backcountry, a path and fence line was 
deployed to herd users past the checkpoint.  
The questionnaire for this research was initially designed to be both completed on-
field and online as part of the Mountain Safety Council’s backcountry intentions form. This 
was based on work by Bjork (2007). However, due to a restructure within the Mountain 








3.5 Summary  
The methods described in this chapter included an account of the transceiver checkpoint and 
backcountry user survey. The transceiver checkpoint was used to gather information on the 
frequency and preparedness of backcountry users. A backcountry user survey was used to 
gather information on the demographics, behaviour and decision making of backcountry 
users. In order to provide context for skier behaviour, weather and snow conditions during 
the 2015 winter season were utilised. This provides an understanding of the motivation for 



























This chapter contains results from this research. An overview of the 2015 winter season 
at CVSA is given. This includes a description of weather and snow stability over the 2015 
season. This is followed by information on the weather and snow stability at CVSA during 
the study period (6-26 August 2015). Observational data is then displayed and consists of 
ski area and backcountry user statistics and transceiver checkpoint data. Information 
obtained from the survey data is then presented. These data are used to investigate the 
demographics of those travelling in backcountry terrain and how these users make informed 
decisions about their behaviour in areas containing a hazard.  
 
4.2 Weather conditions over the 2015 winter season  
Craigieburn Valley Ski Area opened on the 7 July 2015, three days after the intended 
opening date. The delayed opening was due to icy conditions and avalanche mitigation work. 
The weather for the season was characterized by an active pattern with an absence of 
extended periods of high pressure. Storms generally came from the south and western 
quarters (Figure, 4.1), with the highest recorded wind speed on 3 August 2015, where speeds 
exceeded 75 metres per second (270kph). This pattern produced a lot of rain, especially at 
the lower elevation study plot, with 462 mm recorded at Ngahere (1265m). The snow level 
was at approximately 1450-1500 m for the majority of the storm events; therefore, what was 
recorded as rain at Ngahere fell as snow on the upper mountain. At the Ngahere study plot 
observers recorded 133 cm of snow over the 2015 season (Orton and Levy, 2015). The field 





Figure 4.1: Wind rose from Craigieburn day lodge automatic weather station. 
 
Daily average temperatures over the 2015 winter season at CVSA fluctuated between -8o on 
7 July 2015 and 5o on 26 August 2015. Periods of lower temperatures were often 
accompanied by snowfall events (Figure 4.2). The largest of these occurred on 8 August 
2015 where 20 cm of snow fell overnight.  
 





































































































































































4.3 Snow stability during the 2015 winter season 
Ski patrol performed numerous days of control work via explosive testing, ski 
cutting, and closure of terrain. The majority of the team’s control work was done on 
Hamilton Face and the Middle Basin chutes. The majority of explosive testing produced size 
1 new snow instabilities. Additionally, the team performed many hours of ski cutting. This 
procedure was highly effective at indicating areas of instability.  
Prior to the opening of the field a warm advection storm event took place with a 
moist system approaching from the west that collided with cold air moving up the eastern 
side of the Main Divide. The result was a storm that began with high temperatures and rain, 
the air temperature then lowered resulting in snow, and finally the temperature increased 
and caused rain to fall onto the new snow. As a result, the storm contained big snow totals 
(upwards of 50 cm) and large rain totals (~5 cm on the tail end). This caused wide spread 
natural avalanche activity on or around 18 June 2015. Many of the avalanche paths in the 
field activated, including two that buried the access road in rock debris and snow. One of 
the avalanches on the access road during this time was a size 3, with the debris deposit on 
the road upwards of 5 m high. 
The second and most significant avalanche related event of the season took place on 
28 July 2015, when a patroller remotely triggered a size 3-3.5 avalanche on Hamilton Face 
(Figure 4.3). The avalanche was a wet slab that occurred approximately 10 hours after a 
loading event - a significant storm containing a mixture of rain and snowfall. The snowpack 
layer that failed was a layer of facets that were buried on 3 July 2015. It is suspected that the 
failure occurred after the loading event due to the water from the rain storm taking time to 
percolate to the layer of concern, further weakening this layer while adding weight to the 
slab above (Orton and Levy, 2015).  This avalanche caused a secondary avalanche to occur. 
Due to the terrain, the 2 avalanches combined and flowed 400 metres into the valley floor. 





Figure 4.3: Large multiple wet slab avalanches on Hamilton Face on 28 July 2015. Initial 
slide (A) triggered by ski patrol traversing slope above start zone. Crown depth 15-25 cm. 














4.4 Weather conditions over study period, 6 - 26August 2015 
Weather conditions had a control on the number of people using the backcountry. 
The weather over August contained a wide variety of climatological conditions. There were 
periods of strong winds, rainfall, heavy snowfalls and long periods of clear blue skies with 
relatively high temperatures (Figure 4.4). As a result, daily air temperatures ranged from -
8o (9 August 2015) to 5o (26 August 2015). Snowfall was associated with periods of low 
temperatures, with a total of 40 cm falling during the study period. The large range of 
weather conditions altered the snowpack significantly, which had effects on the stability and 
associated avalanche risk over the study period. 
 
 











































































































































































4.5 Snow stability at CVSA, during study period, 6 - 26 August 2015 
Snow stability plays a major role in the decision making of backcountry users. The 
stability of the snowpack, and the layers within the snowpack allow users to determine the 
stability of the terrain that they are wanting to use. By understanding the snow stability over 
the study period, skier behaviour and decision making can be interpreted. 
On 6 August 2015 there was a strong temperature gradient in the top 20 cm of new 
snow (Figure 4.5). Surface temperature was -7.5oC, with the temperature at the bottom of 
the new snow layer approximately -2.5oC. This layer was fairly stable, with explosives and 
ski cutting unable to destabilise the snowpack. The majority of the ski area was affected by 
winds from the W-NW, with wind loading in exposed gullies and guts adding to instability 
in the upper layers of the snowpack. Warming in the afternoon caused some loose avalanche 
point releases as the snow surface temperature increased. Near-surface faceting occurred in 
the snowpack as a result of a clear night and cold temperatures. A large soft snow layer was 
observed between 90 and 165 cm, a result of saturation from rainfall events 2-3 days prior. 
Figure 4.6 shows a snow profile from the 26 August 2015. This snow profile shows 
18 cm of new snow on top of a 5 cm melt freeze crust. This crust was the result of a period 
of warm weather causing the snow surface to melt during the day and refreeze overnight. 
The weather was calm with clear skies and light winds in the morning, with increasing cloud 
cover throughout the day. North facing slopes warmed up rapidly, with a natural wet loose 
avalanche running in on the edge of the ski area (1700 m). Cloud cover from 11:00am 
onwards caused a strong “greenhouse effect”, where longwave radiation is emitted by the 
cloud cover. Loose avalanche point releases were present at all elevations and aspects as the 
new snow on the surface warmed and became unstable. This occurs naturally when solar 
heating reduces the strength of the snow and can initiate sliding. This moving snow can 
accumulate and form into roller balls as more and more snow accumulates. This often occurs 
when there is a strong temperature gradient and when the snow surface is wet (Jones, 2007).  
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Figure 4.6: Snow pit profile on 26 August 2015. Location: Craigieburn Range, CVSA, 
Hamilton Peak.  
 
As shown in Figure 4.7, the Craigieburn Range had good snow stability over the 
study period with only one day given a high avalanche danger rating. There were 3 days 
with considerable and 11 days with moderate danger ratings. Eight days had a low danger 
rating indicating stable conditions in backcountry areas. The forecasted primary avalanche 
type was wind slab, followed by wet, loose avalanches. The danger level decreased with 
elevation, except on days where the temperature was too high for snowfall and rain fell at 
lower elevations. This occurred on 15 August 2015, where the bottom half of the mountain 





The danger level tended to increase immediately after snowfall events and increase 
during periods of warming. This was particularly evident in the days following a snowfall 
event on 8 August 2015. A high danger level in the upper elevation band decreased to low 
over 4 days of clear skies and cold nights causing the snow layer to bond to the snowpack 
and become more stable. There was an increase in the forecasted avalanche danger with 
elevation, with the exception of warm days where the primary danger was for potential wet, 




Figure 4.7: Forecasted snow stability at three elevation bands and primary avalanche danger 
type for the Craigieburn Range backcountry. Determined by ski patrol observations 
throughout the range. 
 
Over the study period there were many small avalanche events. These were mostly 
natural and within closed terrain. However, in several instances there were natural and skier 
triggered events within the ski area and in open terrain. The largest snowfall event of the 
study period on 8 August 2015, was followed by a period of warm weather and rainfall 
falling on lower elevations. This caused many natural avalanches to occur particularly on 
northern facing terrain. Intense solar warming in the morning of 12 August 2015 caused the 
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snow to melt and saturate the snow pack. This lubricated the layer of snow in contact with 
the ground. As a result a slow moving natural wet slab avalanche occurred (Figure 4.8). This 
avalanche ran 100 metres down the slope, eventually losing momentum. On this ridge there 
were three other events at the same time on adjacent ski field terrain and two events within 
backcountry terrain. Many other areas experienced similar events at this time, due to new 
snowfall accompanied by high air temperatures and clear skies. 
 
 
Figure 4.8: 12 August 2015, 11.30am. One of multiple natural wet loose avalanche events 
on northern facing terrain, Craigieburn Valley Ski Area. The width of the avalanche path is 









4.6 Ski area and backcountry user numbers 
CVSA is considered one of the best club fields in New Zealand for easily accessed 
backcountry terrain. In addition to this the field boasts of having the largest proportion of 
advanced and expert terrain of any club field in New Zealand. The number of tickets sold 
from the ticket office (Table 4.1) indicates large fluctuations in users on the field. This is 
both dependent on the snow conditions and the day of the week. Weekends are indicated by 
light grey shading. The ski field is also known for quiet week day skiing and busy weekend 
skiing (Table 4.2), with a large number of its club members living in Christchurch.  
The highest number of ticket sales occurred on Sunday, 19 July 2015 after 20 cm of 
snow fell overnight, which was the first big snow fall since opening weekend. Table 4.2 
indicates that over the 2015 season, Tuesday was the least busy day of the week, with an 
average of 27 ticket sales. This was followed by Monday where the average sale was 28. 
The number of tickets sold increases throughout the week reaching a maximum in the 
weekend. Sundays were the busiest days of the week, with an average of 73 tickets, followed 
















Table 4.1: Daily user numbers from the ticket office at Craigieburn Valley Ski Area (CVSA).  
    Tickets Sold 
  1 August 2015 22 
  2 August 2015 5 
  3 August 2015 Closed 
  Tickets Sold 4 August 2015 Closed 
5 July 2015 0 5 August 2015 35 
6 July 2015 0 6 August 2015 20 
7 July 2015 44 7 August 2015 29 
8 July 2015 12 8 August 2015 172 
9 July 2015 2 9 August 2015 150 
10 July 2015 91 10 August 2015 68 
11 July 2015 111 11 August 2015 52 
12 July 2015 131 12 August 2015 54 
13 July 2015 22 13 August 2015 46 
14 July 2015 47 14 August 2015 Closed 
15 July 2015 Closed 15 August 2015 Closed 
16 July 2015 44 16 August 2015 66 
17 July 2015 53 17 August 2015 52 
18 July 2015 21 18 August 2015 8 
19 July 2015 233 19 August 2015 23 
20 July 2015 30 20 August 2015 39 
21 July 2015 24 21 August 2015 59 
22 July 2015 9 22 August 2015 134 
23 July 2015 14 23 August 2015 60 
24 July 2015 12 24 August 2015 16 
25 July 2015 47 25 August 2015 35 
26 July 2015 Closed 26 August 2015 85 
27 July 2015 Closed 27 August 2015 48 
28 July 2015 4 28 August 2015 35 
29 July 2015 25 29 August 2015 Closed 
30 July 2015 40 30 August 2015 12 







Table 4.2: Daily total and average number of users. 
  Total Average 
Mon 252 28 
Tue 214 27 
Wed 243 30 
Thu 253 32 
Fri 293 37 
Sat 507 63 
Sun 657 73 
 
  
4.7 Transceiver checkpoint data 
In this section, data from the transceiver checkpoint station on the ridge of Middle 
Basin are shown. The infrared sensor (IR) determines the number of people passing the 
station, and the Transceiver Check Point (TCP) determines if that user is carrying an 
operational avalanche transceiver. As indicated by (*) the ticket office conducted a survey 
of all users asking if they were carrying an avalanche transceiver on 8 August 2015 (Table 
4.3). Percentages of those carrying avalanche transceivers, as determined by data from the 
TCP, ranged from 42% to 69% during the study period, with an average of 52%.  
The number of people passing the transceiver checkpoint, including those with a 
transceiver and those without is displayed in Table 4.3. On 18 and 19 August 2015 no one 
accessed the backcountry, as terrain on-field was covered in fresh snow, providing excellent 
skiing conditions. This removed the need for users to travel into backcountry terrain. On 20 
August 2015, 26 people passed the checkpoint. With low numbers using backcountry terrain 
the majority (69%) were carrying avalanche transceivers. In contrast with the highest user 
number day, 22 August 2015. Where over 100 users accessed the backcountry and only 42% 
of users were carrying avalanche transceivers. 
After a snow fall event, there is typically a increasing number of people travelling 
into the backcountry over the subsequent days. This is evident in Table 4.3, which shows 
that a large snow fall event (20 cms) on 18 August 2015 meant that there were very few 
people on the mountain as the weather conditions were poor. The following day was 
characterised by clear weather, however being mid-week there were very few ticket sales. 
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These people didn’t travel into the backcountry as the mountain had plenty of untracked 
terrain. By 20 August 2015 the terrain within the ski area was beginning to be skied out. 
This caused people to venture into the backcountry in search of untracked snow. The number 
of people travelling into the backcountry increased as more and more of the ski area became 
skied out. Over the next 2 days the number of people travelling into the backcountry 






















Table 4.3: User numbers on field and backcountry from sensor and ticket office. Infrared 
sensor (IR) and Transceiver Check Point (TCP) were located on the edge of the ski area 
between ‘Middle Basin’ and ‘Castle’. * indicates that this statistic was gathered from a 
separate survey conducted in the ticket office. Calculated mean does not include data 





Date Tickets IR TCP Percentage with avalanche transceiver 
6 August 2015 20    
7 August 2015 29    
8 August 2015 172  112* 65.1* 
9 August 2015 150    
10 August 2015 68 30 16 53.3 
11 August 2015 52 91 44 48.3 
12 August 2015 54 73 32 43.8 
13 August 2015 46    
14 August 2015 Closed    
15 August 2015 Closed    
16 August 2015 66    
17 August 2015 52 30 13 43.3 
18 August 2015 8 0 0  
19 August 2015 23 0 0  
20 August 2015 39 26 18 69.2 
21 August 2015 59 75 42 56 
22 August 2015 134 102 43 42.1 
23 August 2015 60 32 20 62.5 
24 August 2015 16    
25 August 2015 35    
26 August 2015 85    
27 August 2015 48    
28 August 2015 35    
     
Sum 1251 459 228 Mean = 52.3 
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4.8 Effects on ticket sales and backcountry use 
User numbers are controlled by weather, snow conditions and the working week 
(Figure 4.9). Once the users were on the mountain they were then faced with an option. 
Would they have liked to travel into the backcountry in search of more challenging terrain 
with the allure of fresh turns? Whether or not they pursue this adventure was determined by 
a range of factors. As shown by Figure 4.10 the outcome was not solely based on the number 
of people on the mountain. Ticket sales only account for 55% of the variation in the number 
of backcountry users (Figure 4.10). The remaining variance may be accounted for by other 
factors including, but not limited to; the conditions of the snow within the backcountry, 
avalanche risk, weather conditions, snow scarcity (availability of fresh snow within ski 
area), human factors and weekend trends. As shown in Figure 4.9, ticket numbers are highest 
during weekends and a snow fall event will normally result in an increase of ticket sales 
either the day of or the day after the event.  
 
 
Figure 4.9: Effect snowfall has on ticket numbers, backcountry user numbers and avalanche 


























































































































































































































Figure 4.10: Ticket sales versus backcountry users. 
 
The number of views that the Craigieburn Range Avalanche Advisory received daily 
was collected and is displayed against ticket number in Figure 4.11. Website views peak on 
Fridays indicating that weekend users are checking snow conditions and safety levels before 
they depart for the mountain. Unique views refer to the number of new visitors to the website 
each day. This removes a user viewing the site multiple times and skewing the data. 
 
Figure 4.11: Unique page views of Craigieburn Range Avalanche Advisory and ticket 
sales over the study period, where grey shading indicates weekends. 
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When comparing the website hits to forecasted avalanche danger level, the highest number 
of unique views occurred on 7 August 2015 (Figure 4.12). This was the day prior to the 
Craigieburn Range receiving a high forecasted danger level above 2000 m. Days where the 
forecasted avalanche danger level was low resulted in less people viewing the advisory.  
 
 
Figure 4.12: Daily forecasted avalanche danger and unique page views for the Craigieburn 
Range during the study period. Further information on how to interpret is given in 








4.9 Backcountry user statistics 
A total of 58 users completed the backcountry survey (Appendix C). The 
backcountry survey was completed on mountain after the user had travelled into backcountry 
terrain. Section 3.1 contains demographics of these users. Information on the education, 
experience and preparedness of backcountry users is presented in Section 3.2. Finally, 
subsection 3.3 contains risk perception and decision making statistics. The combination of 
these three sections allows insight into behaviour and decision making in backcountry terrain 
at Craigieburn Valley Ski Area (CVSA).  
 
4.9.1 User demographics 
This section contains statistics of those who filled out the backcountry survey. Their 
gender, age, group size, nationality and the nature of their activity is shown. From these data 
it is possible to get an overview of the demographics of backcountry users at CVSA. Males 
dominate both the survey respondents and the group genders, 81% and 80%, respectively 
(Figure 4.13). These statistics roughly reflect avalanche fatality statistics where 90% of 
avalanche deaths in New Zealand are male (Irwin and Owens, 2004).  
 
Figure 4.13: Gender of backcountry users at Craigieburn Valley Ski Area. a) Gender of 
survey respondents b) Genders of group members of survey respondents. 
The average age of backcountry users at Craigieburn was 42.5 (Figure 4.14). The 
dominant age groups were those in their 50’s (29%) and 30’s (26%). There is a much lower 













make up 51% of avalanche fatalities (Irwin and Owens, 2004). The two dominant age groups 
encountered at CVSA broadly represent those with an expendable income on a trip with 
friends (30’s) and those on a family trip (50’s). Those in their 50’s can also be associated 
with being club members or having an affiliation with the club. 
 
Figure 4.14: Age of backcountry users at Craigieburn Valley Ski Area.   
The majority (35 %) of users travel in groups of 2 (Figure 4.15). This is followed by 
those travelling in groups of 8 (14%). However, this larger group size is over represented 
due to the entire group of 8 completing the backcountry survey. 7% of people travelled in 
the backcountry alone, which is against recommendations of the MSC. 
 
Figure 4.15: Group size of those travelling in backcountry terrain. 


























New Zealand users (66%) make up the majority of the backcountry users at CVSA 
(Figure 4.16). This is followed by Australian users (15%) with the remaining coming from 
the United States (5%), The Netherlands (5%) and other nationalities (9%), including users 
from Switzerland, U.K. and Denmark. 
 
Figure 4.16: Nationality of those travelling in backcountry terrain. 
 
Boot packing with skis dominates the backcountry activity with 67% (Figure 4.17a). 
This is followed by touring skis with skins (22%). The nature of activity included 14% of 
users who did not hike. These people stated that they traversed into terrain from the ski area 
without hiking and indicated boot pack with skis as their activity. People completing a short 
hike (43%) defined as walking for less than 30 minutes were the largest group (Figure 
4.17b). These people were likely to be those skiing in the ‘Castle’ terrain (Figure 3.2). The 
second largest group of people were those completing a long hike (41%), defined as a walk 
greater than 30 minutes. These users were likely to be skiing off “North Peak” or from 















Figure 4.17: Activity (a) and the nature of that activity (b) in the backcountry.  
 
4.9.2 Experience, education and preparedness  
This section includes statistics on the level of experience, education and the 
equipment that backcountry users have. Experience in the backcountry is important when 
facing a problem or hazardous situation. Equally as important is the level of avalanche 
education that the user has. Being able to identify avalanche terrain and avoid it reduces the 
level of risk users are putting themselves or their group in. If the group or an individual is 
caught in an avalanche then it is necessary to have the appropriate avalanche equipment. 
This includes a working avalanche transceiver, shovel and probe. Most people (48%) 
believed that they had a high level of experience in backcountry terrain (Figure 4.18). This 
indicates a sense of familiarity of users with backcountry terrain.  Low experience is defined 
as travelling in the backcountry up to three times a season for less than two seasons. 
Moderate experience is defined as travelling in the backcountry up to three times a season 
for two to five seasons. Considerable experience is classified as travelling in backcountry 
terrain more than 3 times a season for 5 or more seasons. High experience in backcountry 





























Figure 4.18: Self-identified experience level in backcountry terrain.  
 
Backcountry users at Craigieburn had a high level of avalanche education, with 57% 
of users having completed a formal avalanche course. Of these, 31% of users had completed 
an avalanche awareness course and 26% completed Avalanche Stage 1 or 2 professional 
courses (Figure 4.19). There were also a high proportion of people without any formal 
avalanche education (19%), and for 12% of users their highest avalanche education involved 
simply attending public presentations or lectures regarding avalanche risk. Combined, these 
latter 2 groups make up 31% of users having no formal avalanche education. 9% of users 
indicated that they had some form of other training that included avalanche information.  
The most common avalanche course in New Zealand is the Avalanche Awareness 2 
day course (Figure 4.20). In 2014 the number of people taking this course decreased and 
was met with an increase in backcountry and Avalanche Stage 1 participants. The number 
of users who had completed the backcountry course was much lower than expected. This is 
evident in Figure 4.20, which shows the number of people completing avalanche courses in 
New Zealand between 2010 and 2014. The number of people completing the Avalanche 
Stage 1 course was slightly more than the backcountry course. However, the backcountry 



















Figure 4.19: Percentages of users who had completed avalanche courses or another form of 
avalanche training.  
 
 
Figure 4.20: Number of avalanche course participants from 2011-2014 in New Zealand. 


































































The recommended minimum equipment for backcountry travel is an avalanche 
transceiver, shovel and probe (ICAR, 2006; M.S.C, 2015). According to Figure 4.21, 10% 
of backcountry users did not carry an avalanche transceiver, 15% did not carry a probe and 
19% did not carry a shovel. There were very few people with avalanche airbags and ava-
lungs, 7% and 3% respectively. 5% of users travelled in the backcountry without any 




Figure 4.21: Avalanche equipment carried in backcountry terrain.  
Most of the backcountry users surveyed indicated that they carry avalanche transceivers 
when they travel in the back country. Those in their 50’s (79%) are the least likely to carry 
a transceiver, followed by those in their 20’s (86%) (Table 4.4). Those with no avalanche 
education are the least likely to carry an avalanche transceiver (55%). To determine if these 
differences were statistically significant a Chi2 test was used as the data was non-parametric. 
A Chi2 test of education returned a Chi2 value of 16.42 and a p value of 0.0025. This is 
significant at a 95% confidence level indicating a statistically significant difference between 
the responses. Upon further investigation, users who had completed the Avalanche 
Awareness course were more likely to carry transceivers than those with no avalanche 
education. This is supported a Chi2 test returning a Chi2 value of 6.623 and a p value of 0.01, 


























Table 4.4: Transceiver use with age, gender and education. (*) Refers to the two responses 
used for further analysis of educations effect on transceiver use. 
 % with Transceiver Total group size Chi2 test for significance 
Age    Chi2 7.04, p=0.1337 
20's 88.9 9  
30's 93.3 15  
40's 100 12   
50's 76.5 17   
60+ 100 5   
Gender      Chi2 0.023, p=0.8794 
Male 89.4 47  
Female 90.9 11   
Education     Chi2 16.4261, p=0.00249 
None 54.6 11 * 
Lecture 100 7  
Avalanche Awareness 94.4 18 *  Chi2 6.623, p=0.01 
Backcountry Course 100 2   
Avalanche Stage 1 or 2 100 15   









Each user was given a score depending on answers to 5 critical questions. These 
questions covered backcountry experience, avalanche education, avalanche equipment 
carried, group discussion regarding avalanche risk, and what was done to minimalize risk. 
Each response was given a numerical value (0-5), with the maximum score being 25. These 
were split into those not prepared scoring 11 or below, somewhat prepared scoring 12-18 
and well prepared users scoring 19-25. In general, backcountry users at CVSA were poorly 
prepared for travelling in backcountry terrain. However, 16% of users were well prepared 
for travelling in backcountry terrain (Table, 4.5). These users were likely to have the 
recommended gear, and a high level of experience and avalanche education. These users 
were also likely to discuss avalanche risk with their group. The remainder of backcountry 
users were not adequately prepared for the terrain. This indicates many users were either not 
aware of the dangers or were willing to put themselves in higher risk situations given their 
experience in backcountry terrain. 
 
Table 4.5: Level of preparedness of backcountry terrain users. 
Preparedness value Percentage of respondents Number 
Not prepared (0-11) 38 22 
Somewhat prepared (12-18) 47 27 










4.9.3 Risk perception and decision making 
Perceptions of risk are a major part in the decision making process. For backcountry 
users, being able to gather information regarding the avalanche risk in the backcountry is 
paramount to them being able to make an informed decision. Likewise, being able to 
accurately determine the avalanche risk and primary avalanche danger type on terrain that 
they are using is also crucial for good decision making. For accurate risk perception it is 
necessary for there to be easily accessible and obvious information on the avalanche risk in 
the specific backcountry through which they will be travelling. 
The majority (60%) of users obtained the avalanche danger level from ski patrol 
signage on-field and from the ticket office (Figure 4.22). The New Zealand Avalanche 
Centre (26%) and word of mouth (17%) were also important sources of information. Ski 
patrol (3%) and the ski area website (2%) were the least used. Other information sources 
totalled 7% and included ‘experience’, ‘ticket office’, ‘knowledge of area’ and ‘personal 
observations’. 
 
Figure 4.22: Source of daily avalanche danger level.  
 
Daily danger level was generally well known with 59% knowing the danger level 
(Table 4.6). Those who believed the danger level was lower (9%) than the actual and those 
who did not know the danger level (9%) were minor groups. Some backcountry users also 
indicated that the danger level was one scale above the actual level; this was true for 24% 
























able to correctly identify the primary avalanche type. The majority of users were unable to 
identify the primary avalanche type (64%). There was also a group of users who indicated 
they didn’t know what the primary avalanche danger was (12% of backcountry users). 
 Table 4.6: Backcountry terrain user’s ability to determine the avalanche danger of the 
terrain that they were travelling in. 
Today’s danger level Number Percentage 
Don’t know 5 8.6 
1 Scale Under 5 8.6 
Correct 34 58.6 
1 Scale Over 14 24.1 
Primary avalanche type   
Don’t know 7 12.0 
Correct 14 24.1 
Incorrect 37 63.8 
 
The majority of users indicated that the highest danger level where they would still 
use the terrain was considerable (46%), followed by moderate (39%) (Table 4.7). There was 
a small group (12%) of users who would still use terrain when the danger level was high, 
although several of them indicated that this would only be in low angle terrain. Only 14% 
of users indicated that their answer would change if they had all the latest avalanche gear. 
These people increased their highest danger scale by 1 level, thus increasing the number of 
people willing to travel in high and considerable terrain by 5% and 2%, respectively. If 
travelling with an experienced backcountry guide, 52% of users indicated that their answer 
would change. These users increased their highest danger scale by 1 level. This increased 








Table 4.7: Tendency to take risks in backcountry terrain. 
Highest rating where they would still use the terrain Number Percentage 
Low 2 3.5 
Moderate 22 38.6 
Considerable 26 45.6 
High 7 12.3 
Extreme 0 0 
Highest rating with all gear   
Low 0 0 
Moderate 20 35.1 
Considerable 27 47.4 
High 10 17.5 
Extreme 0 0 
* Only 8 would change   
Highest rating with a guide   
Low 0 0 
Moderate 9 15.8 
Considerable 25 43.9 
High 23 40.4 
Extreme 0 0 
* 29 would change    
 
Group leaders were present in 47% of user group’s surveyed (Table 4.8). Users 
travelling in the backcountry indicated that during their trip in the backcountry 79% of users 
did not raise concerns or discuss avalanche danger, pre or during the trip. The majority 
(80%) of users stayed in their group whilst travelling in the backcountry. 
Table 4.8: Group dynamics, leadership and communication 
 Yes % No % Depending on conditions 
Was there a group leader? 46.6 53.5   
Was your safety compromised? 1.7 96.6   
Did the group stay together 81.0 10.3 8.6 
Were you comfortable in your abilities on the slope? 98.3 1.7   
Did anyone raise concerns or discuss avalanche risk? 20.7 79.3   
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Discussing avalanche risk or raising concerns about the terrain is the best way for 
groups to analyse the safety of their intended route (Table 4.9). It is easy to focus on the 
novelty of untracked terrain or the hike into new, exciting terrain. However, when travelling 
in backcountry terrain discussing the risks should be a fundamental part of the trip planning. 
Groups who were less likely to raise concerns and discuss avalanche risk included users 
from New Zealand and users who had travelled in the terrain many times. Users over 60 had 
the lowest rate, followed by those in their 20’s (90%) and 50’s (88%). A Chi2 test returned 
a Chi2 value of 6.17 and a p value of 0.18, resulting in no statistically significant difference 
between age and likelihood of raising or discussing avalanche risk. 
Education is likely to play a role in people’s likelihood to discuss avalanche risk and 
raise any concerns that they may have. Upon investigation there was no statistically 
significant difference when looking at all of the education options.  A Chi2 value of 8.18 and 
a p-value of 0.08 showed that this needed to be investigated further. When comparing users 
with no avalanche education versus those with an Avalanche Stage 1 or 2 qualification, there 
was a clear difference. A Chi2 test indicated a statistically significant difference between 
these two variables, with a p-value of 0.04. This shows that users with an Avalanche Stage 
1 or 2 qualification are more likely to raise concerns or discuss avalanche risk than those 
with no avalanche education. 
Users with a low level of experience in backcountry terrain were the most likely to 
raise concerns about or discuss avalanche danger (43%). This number deceases as 
experience increases. Users with ‘Some’ or ‘Considerable’ experience in backcountry 
terrain were much less likely to raise concerns or discuss avalanche risk (13% each). 
However, for users with a high level of backcountry experience there was an increase in the 









Table 4.9: Demographic variation in likelihood of raising concerns about avalanche terrain 
or avalanche risk prior to or during activity. (*) Refers to the two responses used for further 
analysis of educations effect likelihood of raising concerns. 
 Yes % No % Total responses Chi2 test for significance 
Gender        Chi20.052,  p=0.81 
Male 21.28 78.72 47   
Female 18.18 81.82 11  
Nationality        Chi26.947,  p= 0.07 
N.Z 18.42 81.58 38   
AUZ 33.33 66.67 9   
U.S.A 66.67 33.33 3   
Other 0.00 100.00 8   
Age         Chi26.177, p= 0.18 
20's 11.11 88.89 9  
30's 40.00 60.00 15   
40's 25.00 75.00 12   
50's 11.76 88.24 17   
60+ 0.00 100.00 5   
Activity        Chi21.26, p= 0.53 
Boot pack with Skis 25.71 74.29 35  
Boot pack with Board 40.00 60.00 5  
Tour with Skis and skins 15.38 84.62 13   
Nature of activity        Chi22.489, p= 0.28 
No Hike 0.00 100.00 8   
Short Hike 24.00 76.00 25  
Long Hike 25.00 75.00 24   
Experience in Backcountry        Chi22.927, p= 0.40 
Low 42.86 57.14 7   
Some 12.50 87.50 8   
Considerable  13.33 86.67 15   
High 21.43 78.57 28   
Education       Chi28.188,  P= 0.08 
None 9.09 90.91 11  * 
Lecture 28.57 71.43 7   
2 day Avalanche Awareness 11.11 88.89 18   
4 Day Backcountry course 0.00 100.00 2   
Avalanche Stage 1 or 2 46.67 53.33 15 * Chi24.2, p= 0.04 
Used terrain before        Chi2 4.52, p= 0.21  
No 50.00 50.00 6   
Only once 0.00 100.00 3   
Several times 21.05 79.95 19   




The results contained in this chapter have provided detailed observations of 
backcountry use and user behaviour. From these results three key points were identified. On 
average 52% of users travelling into backcountry terrain at CVSA will carry an avalanche 
transceiver. This ranged between 42%-69% and was shown to be dependent on weather and 
snow conditions as well as the timing within the week. The effectiveness of avalanche 
advisories and avalanche signage was provided. Data from this research indicates that 
information from the avalanche advisory is not being used by backcountry users, with 76% 
of users unable to determine the primary avalanche danger type. Whereas 59% of users were 
able to determine the forecasted avalanche danger level. Users of CVSA’s backcountry 
terrain were shown to be 80% male. Although males make up 90% of avalanche related 
fatalities, this may be related to the frequent and dominant use of backcountry terrain rather 



















This chapter reflects on the key findings of this research, discussed in relation to the 
two objectives of this study. Avalanche transceiver use and user behaviour in backcountry 
terrain are discussed in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 provides a case study of backcountry user 
behaviour after a snowfall event, including changes in transceiver use. This is provided as it 
allows the effect of snow and weather conditions on backcountry user numbers and 
avalanche transceiver use to be viewed. Section 5.4 critically examines decision making of 
backcountry users. The effect that gear use and a guide has on decision making is also 
assessed, as many researchers indicate that there is a level of risk compensation associated 
with these variables (Wilde, 2001; McCammon, 2004; Wolken et al., 2014). Proposed 
modifications to current backcountry signage is also provided. The limitations of this 












5.2 Backcountry transceiver use and user behaviour 
During the study period 6 – 26 August 2015, CVSA had 1251 users’ on-mountain 
and 459 user trips into backcountry terrain. On the busiest day (22 August 2015) users made 
102 trips into CVSA’s backcountry. Avalanche transceiver use varied dramatically 
depending on the number of backcountry users, weather conditions and snowpack stability. 
Survey responses indicate that 90% of backcountry users actively use avalanche transceivers 
when travelling in the backcountry. This is higher than similar surveys conducted by Bjork 
(2007) and Gunn (2010) who show that 77% and 79% of users carry avalanche transceivers 
when travelling in backcountry terrain. However, when users travelled through the 
transceiver checkpoint (Figure 3.5) on the edge of the ski area, the percentage carrying 
avalanche transceivers ranged between 42% and 69%, with an average of 52% (Table 4.3). 
There are several factors that may be influencing the proportion of transceivers being 
used by backcountry users. Users surveyed may be indicating that they do have a transceiver 
in an effort to fit in. This is caused by social influence or the desire to fit in (Sadat, 2011). If 
the users believed that the surveyor wanted them to carry a transceiver then they are likely 
to say that they do regardless of if they do or not. Additionally users may be carrying a 
transceiver but do not have it on when they pass the transceiver checkpoint. Another possible 
factor is the large volume of equipment bags and avalanche gear stored in the lunch hut and 
hanging off ski racks throughout the day. This seems to be common practice, where users 
will carry their gear to the lunch hut in the morning, drop it off and head out skiing for the 
day, picking it up at the end of the day.  
This behaviour may result from comfort issues or more likely heuristic traps. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, heuristic traps are subconscious decision making processes 
following general rules of thumb (Fredston, et al., 1999; McCammon, 2002, 2004). These 
heuristic traps contribute to the human factor in avalanche fatalities. There are four possible 
heuristic traps that users might be consciously or unconsciously falling into. These are 
familiarity, scarcity, expert halo and acceptance.  
The level of avalanche education has an effect on decision making. Those with a 
higher level of avalanche education are likely to be able to identify various factors 
contributing to the safety of the planned route. This is, however, a complicated relationship. 
The data show that those with more experience and avalanche education are more likely to 
carry avalanche transceivers than those with no education (Table 4.4). This indicates that 
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avalanche education is successfully promoting the use of avalanche transceivers. In terms of 
decision making, avalanche education can actually inhibit safe travel within backcountry 
terrain (Fredston, et al., 1999; McCammon, 2004). 
This is the result of a heuristic called ‘the expert halo’, where users are more likely 
to follow someone who is seen to be more experienced or educated than they are. As 
indicated by Table 4.8, 47% of groups contained a leader. This person was likely to be 
chosen due to their level of experience within backcountry terrain or avalanche education. 
It is possible that these leaders were affected by other heuristic traps and their decision 
making may have been affected as a result. As there was very little discussion regarding 
avalanche risk (21% of groups discussed avalanche risk), the decision making process was 
largely left to the leaders. This heuristic can also be related to users who think that they have 
more experience than they actually do and are likely to put themselves at a higher level of 
risk. This may be occurring with 75% of users indicating that they have a considerable to 
high level of experience in backcountry terrain. These users may believe that they have the 
necessary experience or education to get out of an avalanche event. This may cause them to 
value avalanche equipment less and in some cases not carry it at all.  
Acceptance of risk is when the users believe they know the risks and go ahead 
anyway. This is most evident in users travelling alone in the backcountry. These users are 
going directly against recommendations for safe travel in the backcountry. This behaviour 
is likely driven by the close proximity of the ski area to backcountry terrain and influenced 
by familiarity of terrain. Several users indicated that they travelled alone in the backcountry 
which meant that there was no need to carry avalanche gear. This was justified as they 
believed that because they were skiing alone they were less likely to be caught in an 
avalanche. Another justification was that if they were caught in an avalanche they were 
unlikely to survive without companion rescue so there was no point carrying the gear.  
There are also particular demographics that are less likely to carry avalanche 
transceivers than others. Users without an avalanche education are statistically more likely 
to travel into the backcountry without a transceiver (Table 4.4). This is likely due to the lack 
of knowledge regarding avalanche risk and recommended practice. It is these users that are 
most at risk in backcountry terrain, being unaware of avalanche indicators and rescue 
techniques makes them the most vulnerable user group within this terrain. At CVSA 55% 
of users with no avalanche education carried a transceiver. This indicates that these users 
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are getting the message that transceivers are recommended for backcountry travel. Whether 
or not they know how to use them is another question. Users in their 50’s and 20’s seem to 
be less likely to carry an avalanche transceiver, however after statistical testing this was 
proven to not be statistically significant.  
The preparedness of users was also determined (Table 4.5). Many users of CVSA’s 
backcountry terrain were deemed to be unprepared for travelling in backcountry terrain 
(38%). These users were likely to be travelling without appropriate avalanche equipment, 
on their own or without adequate avalanche education or experience in backcountry terrain. 
The majority of users were somewhat prepared for backcountry terrain (47%). These users 
include those who have the recommended gear, moderate experience or basic avalanche 
education. The most prepared users of CVSA’s backcountry make up 16% of users. These 
users are carrying the recommended avalanche equipment and often extras including 
avalanche airbags and ava-lungs. This group represents industry professionals and ski area 
staff travelling in the backcountry. As a result this group includes users with a high level of 
avalanche education and experience in backcountry terrain. It is hoped that through the 
continuation of avalanche education and public awareness campaigning that the level of 
preparedness of users in backcountry terrain will increase.  
A key theme to emerge from Macara (2012) was the highly variable nature of 
snowpack stability. Considerable spatial and temporal variation in snowpack strength and 
stability was observed at CVSA, particularly in terrain with a southerly aspect. Primary 
avalanche terrain (slope angle between 30o-45o) within CVSA’s backcountry is dominated 
by southerly facing terrain (94%). Whereas on-field only 25% of primary avalanche terrain 
is south facing. As there is more south facing terrain in the backcountry, stability testing on-
field is unlikely to accurately represent the stability of the backcountry. This backs up the 
need for all users to be carrying avalanche transceivers when travelling into backcountry 
terrain as conditions are likely to vary from those on-field. It was also found that very 
unstable test results were obtained from within a slope, even though the slope was expected 
to have a good stability. This confirmed that local stability can vary considerably from 
forecasted stability. This research reinforces the need for users to make their own stability 
assessments rather than relying solely on regional forecasts. Data from the present study 
indicate that only 3% of users dig a snow pit and observe snowpack stability. Given the 
highly variable nature of snowpack stability this is alarming.  
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5.3 Backcountry use case study 
The proportion of users carrying a transceiver each day varies greatly depending on 
conditions. After a snowfall event the number of users travelling into the backcountry 
increases. This then has a flow on effect on the number of users carrying an avalanche 
transceiver. This is evident after 20 cm of snow fell on 18 August 2015 (Figure 5.1). When 
the snow fell there only eight users on the mountain. Conditions were poor with high 
westerly winds and periods of intense snowfall. As a result there were no people travelling 
in the backcountry. The following day there were more users on field but because it was a 
Wednesday there were still low ticket numbers. This resulted in users being able to access 
untracked terrain within the ski area boundary all day. As shown in Table 4.3 and Figure 
4.8, there were no backcountry users. By 20 August 2015 users were beginning to travel into 
the backcountry. This was driven by the reduction of fresh powder within the ski area as it 
was skied out. The initial users travelling into the backcountry on this day had the highest 
use of avalanche transceivers of any day in this study (69%). This indicates that the users 
that are travelling into the backcountry first after a snowfall event are more likely to be 
prepared for the terrain. Over the next two days the number of users increases and the 
proportion of users carrying a transceiver decreases (Figure 5.1). The increase in 
backcountry users is in part driven by an increase in ticket sales. Backcountry use on 21 
August 2015 exceeded the number of tickets sold. By the 22 August 2015 there were 134 
tickets sold (Figure 4.1) and backcountry trips totalled 102. This day had the lowest level of 
transceiver use (42%). Interestingly, this suggests the time after a snowfall event influences 





Figure 5.1: Case study of backcountry use after a snowfall event. Boxes on the top of the 
figure indicate the forecasted backcountry avalanche danger level. Grey shading indicates 
the weekend.  
A decreasing backcountry avalanche danger level may play a small role in the 
reduction of transceiver use over time. As this level decreases it becomes more inviting for 
users to travel into the backcountry. Although, as indicated in Macara (2012) the stability of 
backcountry terrain may not be improving. Weak layers tend to persist longer in terrain of a 
southerly aspect, so while overall slope stability may improve, the spatial variability within 
the slope is likely to increase over time.  As more users travel into the backcountry others 
may see them and believe that the terrain is safe. This is known as social proof and is defined 
by McCammon (2002) as the tendency to think that a behaviour is correct or safe because 
others are doing it. This is backed up by Cialdini (2001) who states that others behaviour or 
even the presence of others can have major effects on the decision making process. Tremper 





























































































Snowfall BCA numbers IR numbers Ticket number
2 2 2 1 1 1 
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users travelling into backcountry terrain draws less experienced or prepared users into the 
backcountry. 
From the data collected, is believed that the most at risk time for backcountry users 
is 3 days after a snowfall event. The first day after a snowfall there is plenty of untracked 
terrain within the ski area boundary where avalanche control work is carried out. On the 
second day the more experienced and prepared users begin to travel into the backcountry. 
This is indicated by the high level of transceiver use (69%). By the third day users can see 
tracks in the backcountry and may be prone to social proof and the culture of follow the 
leader. This draws them into the backcountry. Users with no avalanche education and the 
less experienced users are particularly vulnerable at this time, as they are likely to have little 
knowledge of avalanche risk.  
 
5.4 Decision making  
The decision making process begins in the planning stage where users gather 
information on the terrain that they want to ski in. This was done to varying degrees at 
CVSA. The majority of backcountry users (60%) obtained information on the backcountry 
avalanche danger level from ski patrol information on-field (Figure 4.22). As there was 
limited internet access at CVSA the number of users accessing information from online 
avalanche advisories was low (26%). The online advisory for the Craigieburn Range was 
printed out by ski patrol and displayed at the ticket office. The advisory contains additional 
information on avalanche risk including dangerous aspects, the likelihood of an avalanche 
occurring, potential size and time of day that avalanches are most likely. This information 
is summed up in a description and the advisory includes multiple diagrams and graphics to 
convey this information effectively (Figure 5.2). The advisory also includes notes on recent 
avalanche activity, current snowpack conditions and mountain weather forecast. All of this 
information should be used during the planning stage of backcountry travel. Word of mouth 
was the third highest source of avalanche information (17%). This matches the proportion 
of users raising concerns or discussing avalanche risk (20%). There is evidence that 
backcountry users are viewing the online avalanche advisory prior to travelling away for the 
weekend (Figure 4.11), with high numbers of website hits occurring on Fridays. This 
indicates that some users are looking at the avalanche danger in advance, possibly as part of 




Figure, 5.2: Avalanche advisory for Craigieburn Range, 8 August 2015. Accessed from 
www.avalanche.net.nz 
Results from this research indicate that users are not utilising all of the information 
contained within these advisories. As shown in Table 4.6, many of the backcountry users 
are able to indicate the backcountry danger level (59%). This indicates that the danger level 
is well communicated to backcountry users at CVSA. However, the primary avalanche 
danger type is not being communicated to users, with only 34% being able to correctly 
identify the primary avalanche danger type for the day that they were travelling in 
backcountry terrain. As on-field signage does not contain this information users must obtain 
this information from viewing the avalanche advisory, either online or the printout at the 
ticket office. All users must pass the ticket office and the avalanche advisory is in clear view, 
making it very accessible. Evidence shows that people only look at the main danger type 
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and fail to absorb the other specific details. It is possible that there is too much information 
on these advisories and users may be susceptible to information overload. This is defined by 
Milford and Perry (1977) as when the amount of information input exceeds the capacity to 
process that information. When information overload occurs a reduction in decision quality 
is likely to occur (Speier et al., 1999). This may be occurring with the avalanche advisories. 
As there is a wealth of information available on advisories it is possible that users are 
deciding to not read the entire document and to only view the avalanche danger level. When 
asked to indicate if the terrain that they were travelling in was highlighted in the avalanche 
advisory only 12% were correct (Figure, 5.3). The remainder of users did not know (47%) 
or believed that their terrain was not highlighted in the advisory (41%). The high rate of 
users not knowing backs up the idea that the advisory is not effectively transferring 
information to backcountry users. 
 
Figure 5.3, Survey responses to “Was the terrain you travelled in highlighted in today’s 
avalanche advisory?” 
This could be improved by improving on-field signage. The information provided in 
the advisories is all essential but is too much information to display on a sign. The 
description of the conditions at the bottom of Figure 5.2, could easily be transferred to ski 
area signage or even an image of the primary danger type. This would rely on users having 
an understanding of the danger types and the ability to understand the implications of these 
types. The addition of primary avalanche danger, dangerous aspect and a description of the 










Figure 5.4: Proposed additions to backcountry signage. 
There is currently a large amount of research being done into making backcountry 
area signage and warning systems more effective (Burkeljca, 2013: Waller and Schell 2014). 
Waller et al. (2012) published a paper on new avalanche awareness opportunities. This 
research was on the development of a prototype transceiver checking station for access 
points to backcountry terrain. This station combined a transceiver checker, motion sensor 
and basic avalanche information. In a more recent publication Waller (2014) indicates that 
signage was developed for the use of the edge of ski areas at popular access points for 
backcountry terrain. This was combined with a strong social media presence and public 
information evenings. This research shows that the development of simple yet effective 
remote avalanche awareness signage is possible, particularly when implemented and 
maintained by local agencies with support from ski areas (Waller, 2014). Additional 
information, such as up to date avalanche advisories and weather conditions can and should 
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be added to these signs. This is being explored by Waller and Schell (2014), who are 
developing a network of remote forecasting advisories deployed at access points to popular 
backcountry terrain. This technology has the potential to be deployed in New Zealand and 
at CVSA. Deploying signage combining a transceiver checkpoint, up to date avalanche 
advisory and avalanche information would provide all users with enough information to 
make an informed decision about their exposure to avalanches. Potentially reducing 
avalanche fatalities further and increasing the level of avalanche awareness in backcountry 
users. The MSC’s shift from education to signage and safety messaging may in fact be the 
correct decision. By focusing on signage and safety messaging the MSC are able to target 
users of hazardous terrain more effectively. It is hoped that the development of simple yet 
effective signage is collaborated by expert advisors and industry groups in an effort to 
provide a system that can be easily maintained and updated. 
The most crucial factor when travelling in backcountry terrain after having adequate 
gear and knowledge of avalanche terrain is discussing avalanche risk as a group. This allows 
all users to express their observations and concerns about the terrain. At CVSA, 79% of 
users did not discuss avalanche risk or concerns prior to or during travel in the backcountry. 
This may be the result of the decision making process and the influence of group dynamics. 
Zweifel and Haegeli, (2014) suggest that decision making in avalanche terrain is not only 
affected by leadership but also that peoples willingness to speak up in a group situation is 
highly influenced by the dynamic of the group. Group of people have been shown to have 
higher decision making abilities than individuals (Klein, 1998). However, in group 
situations, social dynamics arise that can affect people’s willingness to share information. 
These can range from heuristic traps defined by McCammon (2002, 2004) to shared 
information bias (Zweifel and Haegeli, 2014). Shared information bias is a tendency that 
groups will spend more time discussing something that all members already know rather 
than discussing what only some members know (Forsyth, 2006). In a skiing example this 
may occur with group members discussing the weather forecast rather than discussing 
avalanche risk.  
Unlike other research on the effect that avalanche equipment has on decision making 
(Haegeli et al., 2014: Wolken et al., 2014), this research showed no increase in risk with 
more gear. With only 14% of users increasing the highest avalanche danger level where they 
would still use the terrain when carrying the latest avalanche equipment. This was partially 
due to most backcountry users (77%) indicating that they were already carrying the 
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recommended avalanche safety gear. Asking if their decision making would be affected by 
having the latest avalanche equipment did not return different responses as many were 
already carrying this equipment when travelling in backcountry terrain. What was not 
expected was that users were prone to follow an expert into more dangerous terrain than 
they would normally travel into. This is shown by Table 4.7, where 50% of users would 
travel into more dangerous terrain with an expert than they would on their own. This includes 
23 users indicating that they would travel in backcountry terrain with a high avalanche 
danger with a guide. This is more than double the number of users who would travel in this 
terrain without an expert. This indicates that there is a culture of follow the expert, similar 
to the expert halo heuristic trap defined by McCammon (2004). The data from this research 
indicates that by having a leader within a group, the decisions of that group are likely to be 
heavily influenced by that leader. The role of the leader is to ensure an enjoyable and safe 
experience in the backcountry, while reducing the level of avalanche risk that the group is 
exposed to (Tremper, 2008). Other group members may also feel safer when the decision is 
being made by someone who is seen to know what they are doing.  
 
5.5 Limitations of research 
 This research has several limitations related to the location of the research and the 
methods used. The results of this research are only applicable for users at CVSA. This 
research provides a snapshot of backcountry user behaviour and decision making but more 
surveys, across a larger area are still required. Other research on backcountry behaviour and 
decision making utilise online surveys and are able to gather thousands of respondents. As 
CVSA has limited cell phone reception and internet access this type of survey was not 
possible. 
 When working with humans there is always going to be a degree of randomness. 
This was evident at the transceiver checkpoint where users would walk over the fence and 
bypass the checkpoint. This was limited to a handful of users and was able to be mitigated 
with the implementation of a track cut into the snow to entice users towards the checkpoint. 
A variety of factors also affected the responses of several questions within the survey. 
Respondents seemed to be answering with ideal world answers rather than details from their 
backcountry trip. This may have been an error in the wording of the questionnaire or the 
user being embarrassed at their responses. This was particularly evident with 90% of users 
indicating they always carried an avalanche transceiver. The proportion of users carrying an 
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avalanche transceiver into the backcountry past the transceiver checkpoint was nowhere near 
this level (42-69%). This may have also occurred, due to the limited number of survey 
responses. The age profile of backcountry users did not match expectations from avalanche 
fatality statistics. It is possible that surveys did not include those users who avoided the lunch 
hut and dining room. More survey responses are required to provide an accurate 
representation of the backcountry user population at CVSA. A compulsory survey from the 
ticket office would have meant that the backcountry population would have been better 
represented from the survey. 
 There were some limitations to the data the IR sensor and transceiver checkpoint 
produced. As indicated earlier the IR sensor was able to reset after 0.5 seconds, while the 
transceiver checker took 2 seconds to reset. This meant that when groups of users travelled 
past the checkpoint in close succession the IR sensor would count all individuals but the 
Transceiver checker would miss several and in some cases stay on until the last user passed 
through. This was not very clear from the data but upon visual inspection of groups passing 
the checkpoint it was possible to determine average time between users and filter out errors 
where necessary. A limitation with the IR sensor was that it often counted users multiple 
times. This was due to the angle at which it was facing. Users who wanted to have a look at 
the checkpoint and complete a thorough test of their transceiver were often counted multiple 
times. These were obvious in the data with data points 0.5 seconds apart (same as reload 
time). The sensor was also sensitive to wind, as windblown snow was able to set off the 
sensor. This was evident after a high wind event overnight. Upon checking the station and 
downloading the data it was obvious that there were not 150 users passing the checkpoint at 
4am. Data during high wind and snow transport periods was analysed closely and data 
removed if it necessary. 
 This research provides a snapshot of backcountry user behaviour at CVSA. By 
increasing the number of days of data collection at from 9 to an entire season more accurate 
analysis could be completed. This would allow more accurate representation of avalanche 
transceiver use and backcountry behaviour over time. The addition of more data may also 







6.1 Summary of key findings  
 The aim of this research was to assess the behaviour and decision making of 
recreational users of avalanche terrain accessed from CVSA. This was completed with the 
use of a transceiver checkpoint and backcountry user survey. Transceiver use varied from 
42% to 69% and appeared to depend on snow and weather conditions, as well as timing 
within the week. On average half (52%) of users in backcountry terrain at CVSA were 
carrying an avalanche transceiver. This is very low given the spatial variability of snowpack 
stability and associated avalanche risk in CVSA’s backcountry terrain.  
For the case study provided (Section 5.3), the highest risk to skiers was found to be 
3 days after a snowfall event. The backcountry avalanche forecast was seen to lower after 
the event, indicating more stable snow conditions in the backcountry. However, from 
Macara (2012) it has been shown that backcountry snow stability may be different from on-
field conditions and that the forecasted avalanche danger may not relate to conditions in the 
backcountry. This is particularly true in south facing terrain where snowpack weaknesses 
are likely to persist for longer periods of time. By the third day, due to the number of people 
using the terrain, users are susceptible to social proof and follow the leader mentalities. This 
causes more users to travel into the backcountry, particularly those with no or little education 
regarding avalanche safety. As indicated, these users are less likely to carry avalanche 
transceivers (Table, 4.4). This is backed up by the proportion of users carrying avalanche 
transceivers into the backcountry dropping from 69% on the second day to 56% on the third 
day after the snowfall event. 
This research indicated that the wealth of information contained within the avalanche 
advisories provided by the MSC is not being utilised. This was indicated by Figure 4.22, 
only where 26% of users indicated that they used the avalanche advisory before they 
travelled in backcountry terrain. The most used source for avalanche information was the 
ski area signage at 60%. Not only are a small number of users viewing these advisories, it 
seems that very few are retaining all of the information. When asked what the avalanche 
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danger level was in the terrain that they were using, 59% of users were able to successfully 
answer. This indicates that information on the danger level is being transferred to users via 
means other than the avalanche advisory, such as ski area signage. It is possible that the 
additional information within the advisory is not being understood or there might be too 
much information for many users. This is indicated by users being unable to identify the 
primary avalanche danger type, with only 24% were able to answer correctly. This indicates 
that information on the primary avalanche type is not being transferred to the user 
effectively. 
Changes to ski area signage may aid the transfer of information from advisories to 
users. Incorporating primary avalanche danger type and information on hazardous aspects 
into current ski area signage in the same form as the advisories would improve the ability of 
users to make informed decisions about travelling in backcountry terrain. A holistic 
approach to backcountry access points in New Zealand should be considered. This should 
include signage indicating the danger level and hazardous aspects. Additional information 
on what is required for travel in the backcountry should also be included. This will insure 
users travelling in the backcountry are aware of the conditions and may give inexperienced 
users additional information and deter them if they are not prepared.  
This type of station should be combined with clear delineation between ski area and 
backcountry terrain. Fixed fences are too difficult to maintain in mountainous conditions but 
signage indicating the edge of the ski area could be combined with avalanche advisory 
information at popular access points to New Zealand’s backcountry via ski fields. Current 
fatalities in New Zealand are not severe enough for the significant amount of infrastructure 
that would be required to implement this level of signage across New Zealand. However, 
with the support of ski areas such as CVSA it would be possible to implement simple, 
effective signage to provide supplementary information for users travelling into backcountry 
terrain. 
Initially it was believed that due to the high level of males in avalanche fatality 
statistics (90% in Irwin and Owens, 2004), that women must be making better decisions 
when travelling in backcountry terrain. However, the results from this research indicate that 
the high number of male fatalities may be the result of a higher number of males using 
backcountry terrain. This is indicated by user statistics showing 80% of backcountry users 
at CVSA are male. This may mean that females might not be making better decisions in the 
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backcountry, rather, it is more related to the number of each sex using backcountry terrain 
(Tase, 2004: Adams, 2005). 
The transceiver checkpoint developed and deployed for this research provided a 
compact and effective tool for monitoring backcountry use and the preparedness of those 
users. This equipment could easily be set up at any geophysical location, or implemented 
across a range of sites. The use of the TRAFX IR sensor and accompanying software allows 
for simple analysis of user numbers and temporal trends in backcountry use. It is therefore 
recommended that for backcountry user frequency and preparedness monitoring a similar 
device be used.  
6.2 Future research 
Given the key findings of this research, suggestions for future research can be made. 
The present study provides an insight into backcountry user behaviour and decision making. 
Future research avenues could include gathering more detailed information on snowpack 
stability and determining the actual risk that users are putting themselves in when travelling 
into CVSA’s backcountry. This should be combined with compulsory user surveys to 
indicate decision making and preparedness for the terrain. An online survey of backcountry 
users in New Zealand could be used to gather baseline information on areas of frequent 
backcountry use. A number of transceiver checkpoints could be deployed at a range of 
backcountry access points throughout New Zealand, providing information on the numbers 
and preparedness of users travelling into backcountry terrain.  
Research into simple, effective avalanche advisory signage in remote locations is 
required. As the MSC are now focusing on signage and safety messaging this issue could be 
addressed, at least in part by this organisation. The development of remote forecast stations 
and backcountry signage would be beneficial, however, if the information given in these 
MSC advisories is only applicable for on-field terrain. On-field warnings are potentially 
hazardous for backcountry users who could confuse on-field advisories with actual 
backcountry conditions. It is for this reason that more research is required to determine the 
spatial and temporal variations of snowpack stability in the backcountry in comparison to 
on-field terrain. Ski area operations may need to take responsibly to complete stability 
testing in backcountry terrain in times of heightened risk. Research is also required on the 
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Snow profile interpretation 
This appendix describes the parts of a snow profile. It is provided in order to aid the interpretation 
of snow profiles presented in this study. Note that the snow profile examined in this appendix is an 
artificial snow profile.  
 






















Figure A.1: An example of a full snow profile, presented in the same manner in which all 
snow profiles are presented in this thesis. This profile will subsequently be deconstructed 














Figure A.2: Deconstruction of layer identification, layer hardness, layer thickness, 
snowpack temperature, and weak layer/interface of primary concern. 
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Figure A.3: Deconstruction of snow crystal type, snow crystal size and snow density. Each 
row (and its associated variables) represents the variables measured for each layer 
identified within the snowpack. Layer 7 shows an example of two different types of snow 
crystals being identified within the same layer. As such, two snow crystal sizes are 
provided for that layer, representing the crystal size of each type of snow crystal identified. 
Layer 8 shows an example of liquid water being observed, as indicated by the ‘M’ beside 

























How to interpret Figure 4.12 
 
 































University of Otago – Avalanche Awareness and Backcountry Decision Making, 
Craigieburn Valley Ski Club (CVSC) 2015 
 
This survey is intended to be used to gather information about the decision making of 
backcountry terrain users. Please fill out this quick survey by indicating which response 
applies to you.  
 
Date: _______________ Gender: _________ Nationality: _______________ 
Group size: __________ Group gender: ___ Female   ___ Male 
Age group: □10-19, □20-29, □30-39, □40-49, □50-60, □60+ 
 
1. Which of the below sums up your activity? 
□Boot pack with skis □Tour with split-board □Climbing 
□Boot pack with snowboard □Snowshoe with snowboard □Hike/tramp 
□Tour with skis and skins □Snowshoe only  □Other__________________ 
 
2. What is the nature of your trip? 
□No hike, traverse from ski area  □Long hike/skin, more than 30minutes 
□Short hike/skin, less than 30minutes □All hiking/skinning, no lift use 
□Other________________________ 
 
3. What is your level of experience in backcountry terrain? 
□Up to three times a season for two years or less 
□Up to three times a season up to five seasons 
□More than three times a season for more than five seasons 




4. Please indicate below if you, or someone in your group, has completed any of the 
following avalanche courses or online training courses. “Other” may include other 
alpine training such as tramping, climbing and mountaineering courses where 















Stage 1 or 
2 
Other? 
Person 1        
Person 2        
Person 3        
Person 4        
 
5. What is the danger level in today’s backcountry avalanche advisory (particularly 
in the elevation band where you have travelled or will be travelling)? 
□Don’t know       □Low       □Moderate     □Considerable     □High       □Extreme 
  
6. Where did you get this information from? 
□www.avalanche.net  □Ski patrol signage 
□Ski area website  □Word of mouth 
□Other _________________________________ 
 
7. What is today’s Primary Danger Avalanche Type? 
□Don’t know  □Wet slab   □Storm snow 
□Loose dry  □Cornice fall  □Persistent slab 
□Loose wet  □Wind slab  □Deep slab 
 
8. Was the route you used highlighted in the avalanche advisory (elevation, aspect, 
recent activity, time of day)? 
□Yes   □No  □Not sure  






9. What safety measures did you or your group take to minimise risk in this terrain? 
□None     □Viewed avalanche advisory 
□Observed warning signs on slope  □Snow pit dug or profile recorded 
□ Slope angle or aspect measured  □All of the above 
10. What is the highest danger level where you would still ski/ride a slope? 
□Low       □Moderate     □Considerable     □High       □Extreme  
 
11. Would your answer to the above question change if you had all the latest 
avalanche equipment? (Avalung, transceivers, shovel, probe, emergency transceiver, 
etc.) 
□Yes  _____________ □No  □Not sure   
(If yes please indicate new highest danger level) 
 
12. Again, would your answer change if you were with an experienced backcountry 
guide? 
□Yes  _____________ □No  □Not sure   
(If yes please indicate new highest danger level) 
 
13. Have you or someone in your group been on this route before? 
□No  □Only once  □Several times  □Many times   
If so, when was the last time that you or they used this route? _____________________ 
 
14. What navigation tools are you carrying? 
□None   □GPS   □Topographic map 
□Smart phone (GPS)  □Compass  □Slope angle measurement 






15. What avalanche equipment are you carrying? 
□None   □Avalung   □Tool kit 
□Avalanche transceiver □Avalanche airbag  □Overnight gear 
□Probe   □Personal locator beacon  □Ice axe 




16. Are you carrying a means of communication? 
□No  □Mobile phone □Satellite phone  □Two way radio □PLB 
Other ________________________ 
 
 17. Did you leave intentions with somebody? 
□Yes  □No 
 
18. Who will this person contact if you have not returned at your intended time? 
□Don’t know  □Police/SAR  □Ski Area   □DOC □Other 
 
19. Did you have a group leader?      Yes / No 
 
20. Was your or the groups safety compromised at any stage?  Yes / No 
 
21. Did the party stay together on the slope?    Yes / No 
 
22. Did you feel comfortable in your abilities on this slope?  Yes / No 
 





Is there any additional information that you would like to be freely available to ski 














































Form Updated: May 2015 
UNIVERSITY OF OTAGO HUMAN ETHICS COMMITTEE 
APPLICATION FORM: CATEGORY B 
(Departmental Approval) 
Please ensure you are using the latest application form available from: 
http://www.otago.ac.nz/council/committees/committees/HumanEthicsCommittees.html  
 
1. University of Otago staff member responsible for project:  
Surname First Name Title (Mr/Ms/Mrs/Dr/Assoc. Prof./Prof.) 





3. Contact details of staff member responsible (always include your email address): 
 Nicolas.cullen@otago.ac.nz 
4. Title of project: 
 Avalanche Awareness and Backcountry Decision Making 
5. Indicate type of project and names of other investigators and students:  
Student Research         Names   









6. When will recruitment and data collection commence? 
6th August 
When will data collection be completed? 
 31st August 
 
7. Brief description in lay terms of the aim of the project, and outline of the research 
questions that will be answered (approx. 200 words): 
The aim of this research is to assess the behaviour and decision making of recreational users 
of avalanche terrain accessed from the Craigieburn Valley Ski Field in the central South 
Island, New Zealand. This will be achieved using the following objectives; 
3. To obtain observational information about the frequency and preparedness of users in 
backcountry terrain. 
4. To investigate how avalanche terrain users make informed decisions about their behaviour 
in areas that contain a hazard.  
To achieve these objectives a mixed methods approach will be applied. A variety of 
methods is needed as a wide range of information is required to assess user behaviour, in 
addition to assessing the numbers of, and preparedness of, users. 
To gather data on decision making and the demographics of users, a questionnaire will be 
used. This questionnaire will be completed on the mountain and will allow analysis of 
demographics, education, experience, decision making and preparedness of avalanche 
terrain users. Key informant interviews will also contribute to the analysis of user decision 
making. 
The preparedness of users will be determined by examining their knowledge and 
experience of travelling in backcountry terrain. Industry perceptions and legislation will be 
gathered from key informant interviews with mountain safety organisations, field 
management and ski patrol. The transfer of safety information will also be determined 






8. Brief description of the method. Include a description of who the participants are, 
how the participants will be recruited, and what they will be asked to do:- 
 
Users of Craigieburn’s “Middle Basin” will be asked to complete a survey either during lunch 
or after skiing. These surveys will be hand-written and will be completed on the mountain 
with the researcher (Jeremy Bell) close by to help with any questions. The survey will consist 
of 23 closed questions where the respondent will indicate which answer fits with their 
behaviour or decision-making process. In addition to this there will be 2 open questions 
where additional information outside of the closed questions may be gathered. The survey 
is designed to be completed in less than 2 minutes and contains no personal information 
where the respondent could be identified.  
 
Key informant interviews may occur if a respondent returns thought-provoking or 
interesting answers. These may include answers that give insight into industry behaviour or 
tendencies. These interviews will be informal with the intention of developing further the 
respondent’s answers.  Other key informant interviews will be completed with industry 
professionals. These will be informal interviews where the views and opinions of these 
professionals regarding avalanche awareness will be discussed and recorded. 
 
 
9. Disclose and discuss any potential problems: (For example: medical/legal problems, 
issues with disclosure, conflict of interest, safety of the researcher, etc) 
 
Maintaining and ensuring the security of respondents surveys may be an issue. The data 
collected will be stored securely and only the researcher and supervisor will have access to 
these documents. Furthermore, as required by the University’s research policy, any raw 
data will be stored for 5 years. After this period of time the raw data will be destroyed.  
 
Care will be taken by the researcher to maintain a neutral position when conducting surveys 







*Applicant's Signature:   .............................................................................   
Name (please print): ………………………………………………………. 
 Date:  ................................ 
*The signatory should be the staff member detailed at Question 1. 
ACTION TAKEN 
 Approved by HOD Approved by Departmental Ethics 
Committee 
 Referred to UO Human Ethics Committee 
 
Signature of **Head of Department: .......................................................................... 
Name of HOD (please print): ………………………………………………………. 
 Date: ..................................................... 
**Where the Head of Department is also the Applicant, then an appropriate senior staff member 
must sign on behalf of the Department or School. 
Departmental approval:  I have read this application and believe it to be valid research and 
ethically sound.  I approve the research design.  The research proposed in this application is 
compatible with the University of Otago policies and I give my approval and consent for the 
application to be forwarded to the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee (to be reported to 












Avalanche awareness and backcountry decision making. 
Information sheet for participants 
Thank you for showing interest in this project. Please read this information sheet carefully before 
deciding whether or not to participate. If you decide to participate, we thank you. If you decide not 
to take part we thank you for your time and for considering our request. 
 
What is the aim of this project? 
This project is being undertaken as the research part of a Master’s of Science.  The aim of this 
research is to assess the behaviour and decision making of recreational users of avalanche terrain 
accessed from the Craigieburn Valley Ski Field in the central South Island, New Zealand. This will be 
done by conducting voluntary user surveys where information regarding general demographics, 
avalanche education and decision making will be gathered. This data will then be analysed against 
avalanche fatality statistics and other published and non-published literature to determine trends 
in decision making and avalanche awareness. 
 
Research Questions 
1. How do avalanche terrain users make informed decisions about their behaviour in areas 
that contain a hazard? 
2. Are their decisions affected by education, if so how does this affect their decision making? 
3. Do the fatality statistics match up with user statistics? 
4. How can we improve current techniques for avalanche awareness to reach those in need? 
 
What types of participants are being sought? 
Users of terrain known as “Middle Basin”, who are passing outside of the ski area boundary are the 
primary target group for this research. Secondary groups include individuals using terrain outside 
of the ski area boundary other than Middle basin and those who have industry experience (guiding 
or ski patrol). Anyone whose capacity to give informed consent is compromised in anyway will not 
be included in the research. Children (under 18 years) will not be consulted in this project, unless 
they are accompanied by their caregiver who consents on their behalf. 
 
What will participants be asked to do? 
Participants will be asked to fill out a quick survey, which should be completed in less than 5 
minutes. The researcher will be at hand to answer any questions regarding the surveys contents. 
Upon gathering the completed surveys the researcher may conduct a quick informal interview 
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regarding the participant’s responses. There will be no identifying personal information gathered 
in this research.  
 
Can participants withdraw from this research? 
The participants are able to remove themselves from the research at any time.  
 
What data or information will be collected and what use will be made of it? 
This study uses interviews and questionnaire surveys as principal methods of data collection. The 
data will be used to answer the aforementioned research questions and provide an overview of the 
demographics and education of backcountry terrain users at Craigieburn. Gathered information will 
only be used by the researcher and research supervisor. All information will be held in trust in the 
Department of Geography and will be destroyed after 5 years as per the University of Otago 
regulations. 
 
If you have any questions about the project, either now or in the future please feel free to contact 
Jeremy Bell (researcher) 
University of Otago 












Avalanche awareness and backcountry decision making 
Consent form for participants 
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is 
about. All my questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  
I know that: 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary. 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time. 
3. There are no known or anticipated risks to participating in this study. 
4. No personally identifying information will be gathered. 
5. This project involves an open-questioning technique where the precise nature of the 
questions which will be asked have not been determined in advance, but will depend on 
the way in which the interview develops. In the event that the line of questioning 
develops in such a way that I feel hesitant or uncomfortable, then I may decline to 
answer any particular question(s) and/or may withdraw from the project without any 
disadvantage of any kind.  
6. There is no remuneration for participating in this study. 
7. I grant / do not grant* permission to allow the researcher to use my identity (* please 
circle) 
I agree to take part in this project. 
............................... (Signature of participant) (Date) 
............................... (Signature of researcher, acknowledging receipt) (Date)  
